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PREFACE 
I first became interested in the interface between 
science and spirituality in 1965, when I began studying the 
"spiritual science" of Yoga through the s·elf- Realization 
Fellowship in Los Angeles. In 1970, I came across some 
rather arcane material in the Rosicrucian teachings that 
alluded to such an ancient connection, and this sparked my 
interest in reading about the historicaf alchemical 
tradition. Through the early 1970's, while studying 
comparative religion, philosophy, education and Jungian 
psychology as an undergraduate, I studied and practiced 
traditional Tantra and Raja Yoga under the spiritual 
guidance of Shrii Shrii Anandamurtijii of India, and was 
intrigued by the interest of the traditional yogic monks in 
science. However, it wasn't until the publication of 
Fritjof Capra's book The Tao of Physics, in the 
mid-seventies, that I really began to comprehend the 
emergence of a new paradigm in which the ideas long 
expressed by mystics and yogis might actually prove to be 
consistent with the ideas arrived at by Western scientists. 
I entered graduate school in 1987 with the intention of 
examining these links from a critical, rational perspective, 
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to determine their epistemological implications, if any, and 
by extension, their potential impact on curriculum inquiry 
and practice. 
This dissertation is a speculative, philosophical/ 
conceptual analysis that deals with the construction of 
knowledge. Coombs and Daniels, in Forms of Curriculum 
Inquiry (Short, 1991), propose that this form of inquiry 
aims at understanding and improving the sets of 
concepts or conceptual structures in terms of 
which we interpret experience, express purposes, 
frame problems, and conduct inquiries. It is an 
important part of all curriculum research because 
the conceptual structures we possess determine the 
kinds of curriculum policies we can entertain and 
the kinds of empirical and normative research 
questions we regard as significant (p. 27). 
My explorations into admittedly esoteric dimensions of 
curriculum theory could not have been accomplished without 
the support and encouragement of my long-time advisor, 
curriculum theorist Russell Dobson. I consider it a 
remarkable act of "synchronicity" (see chapter five for the 
elucidation of this concept) that our paths crossed when 
they did, at a time when we both were intrigued with the 
"new science", as it has come to be called. I wish to thank 
the other members of my doctoral committee, Dr. Adrienne 
Hyle, Dr. Larry Perkins, and Dr. David Yellin for their 
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support of my work at Oklahoma State University. I am 
deeply appreciative of the intellectual guidance of Dr. 
Doren Recker, in the philosophy of science; Dr. Joe Pearl, 
in the study of transpersonal human development; Dr. Michael 
Taylor, in philosophy; Dr. Randy Koetting, in critical 
theory; Dr. Dan Selakovich, in the social foundations of 
education, and to all of the faculty and graduate students 
at Oklahoma State University who participated· in two years 
of discussion of these ideas through the Institute for the 
study of Alternative Paradigms in Education. I am grateful 
to Dr. Kenneth King, Dean of the College of Education, for 
supporting my work as research assistant,: then associate, 
then as a Holmes Scholar. Special thanks to the College of 
Education for awarding me the Robert Glenn Rapp Foundation 
Distinguished Fellowship, and the Dean J. Andrew Holley 
Scholarship. 
I would also like to thank the Wholistic Education 
Special Interest Group and the Critical Issues in Curriculum 
Special Interest Group of the American Educational Research 
Association for their willingness to sponsor paper 
presentations and symposia on these topics since 1989. As 
well, I would like to thank the editors of the Journal of 
Curriculum Theorizing, both for the opportunity to present 
portions of these ideas at the annual Bergamo conference, 
and for honoring me with the Annual Aoki Award in Curriculum 
for an early part of this work. Colleagues and friends who 
have been especially influential in the development of my 
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thinking are Donald Oliver, Chet Bowers, Peter 
Gray-Whiteley, NoelGough, Aostre Johnston, Bill Doll, Ron 
Miller, Bill Pinar and Jeff Kane. I thank them all for 
their support. Though I never met him, I am deeply grateful 
for the work of curriculum theorist James Macdonald, who 
really opened up the field of curriculum to the 
consideration of the spiritual dimension of experience. 
Many thanks go to my current colleagues at Goddard 
College, especially the members of the interdisciplinary 
feminist research group who have shown real enthusiasm for 
the work of translating this theoretical framework into 
practical curriculum considerations. Thanks too, to Steve 
Schapiro and Ken Bergstrom, my colleagues in teacher 
education, for their willingness to move forward with these 
ideas in the development of innovative graduate education 
for teachers. 
I am deeply grateful to members of my family for their 
support and encouragement through the last few difficult 
years of this work - to my parents, Shirlie and Jim 
Rudonick, for their continued material and emotional 
support, and especially to my four dear sons: Shiva Kumar, 
who taught himself the principles of quantum mechanics by 
the time he was fifteen, and who is now providing me with 
numerous insights into the cultural implications of my ideas 
through his studies in cybernetics and chaos theory; Shaman, 
interested in the spiritual dimensions of my work, for his 
deep insights into Jung's ideas; and to Ram and Christopher, 
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young fellows who have had to put up with a much-too-busy 
and somewhat abstracted mother throughout their formative 
years. Despite my work as a teacher and a scholar for most 
of the last 30 years, I have learned more about education 
from my four boys than from any other source, so this work 
is dedicated to them. 
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CHAPTER I 
SCIENCE AS NARRATIVE 
May God us keep 
From single vision and 
Newton's sleep. 
William Blake 
The story of science is a narrative about the world, 
constructed by human beings. In a somewhat paradoxical way, 
what we in the Western world know about ourselves as human 
beings has come to us largely through the investigations of 
science. This "feedback loop" has led some modern observers 
to suggest that we are largely responsible for the 
construction of our own reality. In this introductory 
chapter, we will take a look at how our human story has both 
shaped, and been shaped by, the narrative of science. 
The scientific endeavor stakes a unique claim among a 
multiplicity of knowledge systems - the claim that it alone 
embodies value-free information. The cultural success of 
modern Western science rests largely upon the heuristic 
value of separating matters of objective, verifiable fact 
from the fuzzy realm of subjectivity and human interest. 
1 
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The work of Thomas Kuhn (1962) however, and other 
philosophers and historians of science, suggests that 
science is but one among many narratives, or human stories, 
subject to the vagaries of cultural imperatives, dogmas, and 
power. 
A Micro-History of the Science Story 
Prior to the 17th century scientific revolution, the 
dominant metaphor for material reality in the Western world 
was an organic one. This thinking was rooted in Greek 
concepts of the world as an intelligent organism, concepts 
which, when refined, modified, and synthesized with later 
systems of thought produced the spectrum of Renaissance 
organismic philosophies. Common to all of these was the 
idea that all parts of the cosmos were related in a living 
unity, were mutually interdependent, and were reflective of 
changes in the rest of the cosmos. The smallest grain of 
sand was linked to the sphere of the stars and 
constellations in a living "chain of being", an ordered 
hierarchy in which each member shared particular features 
with the levels both above and below, yet possessed some 
unique characteristic. Humans occupied the niche between 
the animal world, with which they shared sensation, and the 
angelic realm, with which they shared rationality. Nature 
was perceived to be the immanent manifestation of God's law 
in the world. As above, so below. The shift from 
Aristotle's natural philosophy to Galileo's mathematization 
of nature is an early example of a reconceptualization of 
common data - a new human story - which represented a new 
way of thinking about physical reality. In significant 
ways, this shift paralleled the movement away from a 
pantheistic, naturalistic theology toward an absolutist, 
transcendent theology. This shift is worth examining, for 
it represents how the particular forms used to represent 
reality reflect and sustain particular worldviews. 
Aristotle's Story 
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Aristotle dwelt on a fixed and stable Earth in the 
center of the universe, nestled in a hierarchy which 
encompassed the cosmos down through the smallest grain of 
sand. His was a complex and colorful world, governed by a 
multiplicity of Unmoved Movers (gods) and subject to their 
unpredictable whims, tantrums and diverse personalities. 
The prevailing pantheistic worldview saw Divine energy as 
immanent in nature, and the animating principle which bound 
all of nature together insured that everything stayed in, or 
returned to, its proper (natural) place~ On a solid and 
unmoving earth, the natural place of everything was at rest, 
and any motion presupposed interference with this otherwise 
perfect condition. Aristotle brought order and coherence to 
this world through the combination of astute observation and 
deductive logic, providing explanations that would satisfy 
the Western world for most of the next 800 years. 
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To accomplish this, he utilized the syllogism, a 
pattern of logical thinking which employs a major premise, a 
minor premise and a conclusion, as his main instrument for 
reaching scientific conclusions. This form was derived from 
the already existing geometry (Gr. "earth, to measure") of 
his time. The syllogism links a fact (garnered through 
careful observation) and the reason for the fact in three 
statements by connecting the term in question with a 
particular cause. He believed that a comprehensive 
understanding of all four causes could explain anything in 
nature. 
This geometry starts from the assumption that a certain 
group of facts are true, tells the meaning of certain words, 
then proves the truth of statements. Conclusions of this 
deductive logic are "valid" rather than "true", because the 
starting premises are articles of faith. "All men are 
mortal" is a statement reflecting an assumption (all the men 
you have known or heard of have been mortal). "Socrates is 
a man" tells the meaning of the word Socrates. "Socrates is 
mortal" proves, given these meanings and assumptions, to be 
a valid statement. 
Physics for Aristotle (physis, {Gr.} "nature"), dealt 
with ordinary objects - independent, changeable and temporal 
"stuff". Mathematics, on the other hand, dealt with mental 
constructions (abstractions), and was dependent, unchanging 
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and absolute. His assumption that the heavens were composed 
of a different substance (ether} than earthly matter (which 
consisted of the elements of earth, water, fire and air) 
could have accounted for his inability to reconcile 
mathematical abstractions with physical reality, for like 
mathematics, the heavenly realm was unchanging and absolute 
(Spielberg & Anderson, 1987, p. 51). He did not believe 
that the cause for a physical thing could be derived from 
mathematics. For Aristotle, ordinary experience was 
primary. His approach to understanding phenomena was to not 
interfere or "mess with" nature, but merely to observe. As 
we shall see, this differed substantially from the approach 
Galileo took to comprehend and communicate truths about 
nature. 
Transition Between Aristotle and Galileo 
Between Aristotle's disinclination to apply math to the 
physical world and Galileo's collapse of physics and 
mathematics was a gradual movement to combine physical 
properties and quantification. The condemnation, by the 
Bishop of Paris in 1277, of many of Aristotle's central 
statements epitomized the conflict between Reason and Faith, 
or more particularly, that between Natural Philosophy and 
Christianity. For example, Aristotle's insistence that 
qualities could only be properties in things challenged the 
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Christian notion of Transubstantiation, which proclaimed 
that qualities could take on a life of their own (as in the 
transformation of bread and wine into the body and blood of 
Christ). The imposition of theological dogma loosened belief 
in Aristotle's notion that certain things were illogical, or 
physically impossible, and paved the way for the general 
acceptance of the miraculous, or God's intervention in the 
working of nature. This new mindset more-easily 
accommodated the intervention of mathematics in nature also. 
An important new development at this time was the use 
of diagrams to illustrate qualitative changes. A horizontal 
continuum of change from one state to another was divided 
into ordinal degrees in this intermediate movement toward 
quantification. Oresme began to relate quality to quantity, 
and the 14th century saw a move from thinking proportionally 
to applying numbers to reality. Area began to have meaning, 
within the two-dimensional representation of latitude 
(qualitative intensity) and longitude (extension in space 
and time). While math was not yet used to predict, or create 
general laws, or measure precise motions, Oresme's work was 
an important intermediate step toward conceiving of math as 
the key to understanding physical reality. 
Galileo's Story 
With Galileo began the scientific reduction of 
phenomena to the primary aspects which were measurable 
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(shape, motion, mass, distance). Secondary aspects, such as 
color, heat and smell were viewed as accidental 
relationships between humans and objects, and relegated to 
the status of "noise" or irrelevant data. The common sense 
and everyday experience Aristotle had favored were put aside 
in favor of quantitative, exact laws. The physical "stuff" 
that had occupied Aristotle was simplified to geometric 
lines and points, as realism was sacrificed for precision. 
The notion of an homogeneous, mathematically pure "space" 
replaced Aristotle's notion of an active, causally relevant 
"place", justifying the transition from a concern with real 
"stuff" to a concern for disembodied points and lines. 
Galileo's acceptance of Copernicus' notion of a moving earth 
effected a shift from the notion of "rest" to the more 
dynamic notion of "inertia". 
Experiment supplanted experience, but experiment was 
invoked not to prove but to teach what was already known. 
The system Galileo employed was more rational than 
empirical. If something was deducible from a geometric 
proof, that was explanation enough, in Galileo's opinion. 
His pres~ntation of facts started from a proposition, moved 
to deduction, then was checked by experiment. As in 
geometry, a person had to assume the veracity of Galileo's 
initial assumptions in order to understand further premises. 
The effort was no longer to try and picture physical 
reality. Of primary importance was to tend to the math. 
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Galileo's movement away from Aristotle's empiricism is 
demonstrated by his justification of the uniform motion of 
an object in free fall, not on the basis of observation, but 
on the basis of simplicity. An assumption of an orderly, 
rational God underlies this premise, in contrast to the 
chaos of Aristotle's theological multiplicity. God was, by 
this time, One - omnipresent and omnipotent - a God 
(extrinsic to nature) who had set down immutable (and 
simple) laws in the beginning of time to govern the 
universe. (According to Aristotle, there was no beginning 
of creation, hence the impossibility of a single lawgiver.) 
Galileo's God, like mathematics, was the epitome of Reason, 
whereas the gods of Aristotle's time had often appeared 
irrational and arbitrary. 
Which Story is Most Useful? 
The evaluation of the efficacy of one scientific paradigm 
over another must rest on the question of what one is trying 
to accomplish. The goal will determine what is counted as 
important data and what is discounted as noise. Aristotle 
and Galileo each thought that different aspects of motion, 
for example, were important to attend to. Galileo attended 
to distance and time and ignored friction and resistance. 
Aristotle attended to resistance. Galileo's move toward 
increasing abstraction and the narrowing of relevant data 
was an effort to gain precision in the description of 
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isolated phenomena. Galileo was attempting to develop a new 
way of ·doing science. He overturned commonsense concepts by 
his correspondence of time to latitude and velocity to 
longitude. This caused people to think in terms of space 
instead of time, therefore changing the nature of the 
problem set. Any such conceptual shift redefines basic 
problems. Much experience was given up in the move toward 
mathematical abstraction, and such experience was only 
allowed back into the domain of study as measurements were 
able to be performed upon it. In classical physics, which 
Galileo helped to develop, all causes except the efficient 
cause were, for the most part, put aside. With this, 
questions of meaning and value diminished in importance and 
a narrow utilitarian notion of science began to dominate. 
Aristotle's more holistic appreciation of phenomena gave way 
to a fragmented and mechanistic approach to understanding 
the world. 
The Mechanistic Worldview 
The new mechanical philosophy developed by French 
thinkers Mersenne, Gassendi, and Descartes in the 1620 1 s and 
1630's replaced the animistic, organic assumptions about the 
cosmos with an atomistic theory, in which dead, inert 
particles were moved about in space by external rather than 
inherent forces (Merchant, 1980, p. 125). In this 
mechanized view of reality, self, society, and the cosmos 
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were reunified in terms of a new metaphor - the machine. In 
the old worldview, order had been understood to mean the 
function of each part within the context of the whole, with 
power emanating downward through cosmic and social 
hierarchies. In the new mechanical world "order was 
redefined to mean the predictable behavior of each part 
within a rationally determined system of laws, while power 
derived from active and immediate intervention in a 
secularized world" (Merchant, 1980, pp. 191-192). The "how" 
of phenomena occurred, rather than the "why", according to 
historian Morris Berman, became increasingly important, and 
the "marriage of reason and empiricism, mathematics and 
experiment, expressed this significant shift in perspective" 
(1981, p. 14). 
The new mechanistic view of physical reality, unlike 
the atheistic, materialistic notions which evolved later, 
was incorporated within a supernaturalistic and dualistic 
framework. Newton's synthesis of Galilean terrestrial 
mechanics and Copernican-Keplerian astronomy fostered the 
perception of a clockwork universe set in motion by God and 
left undisturbed - an objective universe independent of 
human will and purpose. This interpretation of material 
activity centered around the dualism between the passivity 
of nature and the externality of force, superseding the 
primacy of process, flux, and change exemplified by the 
older, organic order, with the stability of structure, being 
and identity. Classical physics and its accompanying 
philosophy structured human consciousness to believe in a 
world composed of atomic parts - inert parts moved by 
material and efficient causes: 
God in the beginning formed matter in solid, 
massy, hard, impenetrable moveable particles, of 
such sizes and figures and with such other 
properties and in such proportion to space as most 
conduced to the end for which he form'd them; and 
that these primitive particles being solids are 
incomparably harder than any porous bodies 
compounded of them; even so very hard as never to 
wear or break in pieces; no ordinary power being 
able to divide what God himself made one in the 
first creation ... And therefore, that nature may be 
lasting, the changes of corporeal things are to be 
placed only in the various separations and new 
associations and motion of these permanent 
particles (Newton, 1730, p. 400, in Merchant, 
1980, p. 278). 
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The vision of nature conceived by Descartes and 
perfected by Newton successfully effected a division in the 
human psyche - "mind from body, subject from object, knower 
from known in a lethal split which has yet to heaJ." 
(Hampden-Turner, 1981, p. 30). For the past three 
centuries, the mechanical, atomistic worldview has been the 
guiding ideology of the increasingly industrialized and 
secularized West. The dominant scientific view reduces 
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material reality to increasingly smaller parts, isolates 
them from their living context, extracts bits of information 
and attempts to formulate theories and concepts from such 
partialities (the relatively new science of ecology has been 
a significant exception to this mode of inquiry). 
"Experiment, quantification, prediction, and control formed 
the parameters of a worldview that (would have) made no 
sense within the framework of the medieval social and 
economic order" (Berman, 1981, p. 37), and science has 
become the mental framework, the mode of cognition of modern 
society. Three major assumptions of the modern outlook, 
accord~ng to religious philosopher Huston Smith, are that: 
1. Reality is ordered. 
2. Reason is capable of discerning that order as it 
manifests in nature's laws. 
3. Human fulfillment consists in discerning these 
laws. 
Postmodern Science and the 
Post-Mechanistic Worldview 
Twentieth century physics, perhaps the zenith of 
rational, theoretical science, while still viewing the 
universe in terms of fundamental particles, has begun to 
challenge some underlying assumptions of the prevailing 
mechanistic worldview with its explorations into the 
subatomic, quantum world. Frontier thinkers are no longer 
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convinced that reality is orderly, or that the human mind is 
capable of grasping that order. The abstractions of 
theoretical physics have increasingly focused on the 
invisible structures of the universe, and as physicist Heinz 
Pagels states, 
The cosmic code has become invisible. The unseen 
is influencing the seen (1982, p. 311}. 
While modern physics uncovered a world at odds with our 
senses, we have, for the most part, come to terms with the 
notion that apparently solid; motionless objects are 
actually "alive" with electrons circling their nuclei a 
million billion times per second All we had to do, 
according to Smith, to accommodate such facts, was to 
"replace the earlier picture of a gross and ponderous world 
with a subtle world in which all was sprightly dance and 
airy whirl" (1982, p. 8). The postmodern world of quantum 
physics, however, is not only at odds with our senses, but 
with our imaginations, presenting us with enigmas for which 
our present mode of thought may be insufficient. How to 
conceive of light that is both wave and particle, or of an 
electron that passes from orbit to orbit without traversing 
intervening space? The undermining of certainty and 
continuity occasioned by such multiple crises of perception 
have contributed to a mindset that has lost the conviction 
that reality is ordered in any comprehensible way, one which 
"enshrines the discontinuous and reinforces our ability to 
tolerate the incommensurable" (Gitlin, 1988). 
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Increasingly, there are signs that people have lost 
confidence that solutions to pressing problems exist within 
the assumptions of the mechanistic worldview. In fact, many 
theorists (Bohm, 1983; Ferguson, 1980; Capra, 1983; Wilber, 
1983) suggest that the fragmented and atomistic mode of 
perception generated by the Scientific Revolution is to a 
great degree responsible for the chaos, violence, 
_exploitation and destruction in the contemporary world, and 
all of them have presented their own coherent versions of 
the worldview on the horizon. The philosophies reflected in 
thes~ new conceptualizations, while deconstructing or even 
- discounting many of the achievements of science, rest 
largely upon ideas generated by science. Much of this 
thesis will be devoted to the changing worldview brought 
about by some of the more significant scientific ideas of 
the century. 
The Reconceptualization of the Human Subject 
Central to changing ideas about the nature of reality 
is an emerging reconceptualization of the self, or human 
subject. In We've Had 100 Years of Psychotherapy: And the 
World's Getting Worse, James Hillman and Michael Ventura 
suggest a radical redefinition of self. Both Oriental and 
Occidental traditions, they say, have defined self as 
the interiorization of the invisible God 
beyond ... Even if this inner divine is disguised as 
a self-steering, autonomous, homeostatic, 
balancing mechanism; or even if the divine is 
disguised as the integrating deeper intention of 
the whole personality, it's still a transcendent 
notion, with theological implications, if not 
roots (1992, p. 40). 
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The redefinition that they are working with begins to 
approach, as we shall see, a notion of self consistent with 
changing ideas in science: 
I would rather define self as the 'interiorization 
of community' ... if the self were defined as the 
interiorization of community, then the boundaries 
between me and another would be much less 
sure ... and 'others' would include not just other 
people, because community, as I see it, is 
something more ecological, or at least animistic. 
A psychic field. And if I'm not in a psychic 
field with others - with people, buildings, 
animals, trees - I am not (p. 40). 
This reconceptualization of the self, or the human 
subject, is not an arbitrary theoretical construction of a 
bored psychotherapist. It is, rather, embedded in a 
constellation of cultural events and ideas from such varied 
spheres as literature, science, the arts, ecology and 
metaphysics. To illustrate a deeper layer of connection 
that links all life, Hillman and Ventura speak of certain 
historical periods when forceful cultural currents sweep 
creative people from many disciplines up in the flow of 
thoughts and events: 
We could say that something courses through the 
collective and is picked up and expressed in 
different mediums by different individuals, and 
that that expression constellates a kind of 
subcollective around it, a style of music or a 
school of painting or a branch of science, to 
articulate back to the collective this impulse 
that came, originally, from the collective. This 
something, this impulse, this idea, hasn't a will 
so much as a force - a force so strong that it's 
felt by individuals (individual scientists or 
artists or thinkers) as a compulsion, as something 
they must express. It's not that there isn't deep 
personal originality and courage in what we do 
individually; it's that what we work with as 
individuals is an impulse or wave or force that 
courses through the collective we belong to (p. 
59) • 
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This sort of reconceptualization of the self is just 
this kind of impulse, embedded in a larger reorientation of 
ideas which some innovative thinkers, influenced by Thomas 
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Kuhn's 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
have heralded as a "paradigm shift" (Capra, 1983; Ferguson, 
1980). It is a seductive notion, their idea that a small, 
critical mass of creative thinkers and activists might 
thrust the planet into a whole new way of thinking and 
being. Indeed, there are elements of "paradigmatic 
thinking" in Hillman and Ventura's idea of "an impulse or 
wave or force that courses through the collective we belong 
to" (1992, p. 59). Paradigmatic thinking is ambitious 
thinking. 
Paradigms, Worldviews and Jiggling Webs of Reality 
In their book Deep Ecology, Devall and Sessions define 
a social paradigm as the "collection of values, beliefs, 
habits and norms which forms the frame of reference for a 
collectivity of people, such as a nation". They posit 
several elements of thought and action present in a 
paradigm, or worldview (they use the terms interchangeably): 
1. There are general assumptions about reality, 
including man's (sic) place in nature. 
2. There are general "rules of the game" for 
approaching problems which are generally agreed 
upon. 
3. Those who subscribe to a given worldview share a 
definition of the assumptions and goals of their 
society. 
4. There is a definite, underlying confidence among 
believers in the worldview that solutions to 
problems exist within the assumptions of the 
worldview. 
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5. Practitioners within ·the worldview present arguments 
based on the validity of data as rationally 
explained by experts - be they scientific experts 
or experts in the philosophy and religious 
assumptions of the worldview (1985, p. 42). 
According to John B. Cobb (Griffin,1988, p. 101), 
worldviews are always and necessarily universal 
generalizations made from some aspect or aspects of the 
world as experienced. Stanley Krippner concurs, stating 
that "worldviews arise from epistemologies which, in turn, 
are generated by the motivations that control them" 
(Griffin, 1988, p. 130). From these points of view then, we 
might define worldviews as tacitly agreed-upon conceptual 
structures that define, and thus limit, prevailing 
perceptions of reality, which in turn define, and thus 
limit, the worldview. This dilemma is surely one of the 
more significant ironies of postmodernism. 
Clearly, a redefinition, or reconceptualization of the 
human subject is at the core of any emergent paradigm of 
reality. The notion of "paradigm shifts", however, is 
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fraught with theoretical and philosophical problems, not the 
least of which is its essentially modernist overtones. It 
is very much embedded in Enlightenment notions of 
progressive, evolutionary change, and while radically 
different in content, Marx's utopian social order, 
liberalism's enlightened rational polis, Christianity's 
rapture, and the New Age millennium all share a common 
structural component: the notion that history is linear and 
has a culmination point (Kesson, 1991, p. 46). A paradigm 
shift implies that a new theoretical framework has emerged, 
clearly victorious, in the battle for the mindset of the 
collective consciousness. 
I have come to feel much more tentative about the idea 
of paradigm shifts than many theorists, perhaps because I 
fear the totalistic thinking that seems inevitable when 
groups of people feel that they "have found the way". I am 
also mindful of the necessary relationship between theory 
and practice, and suspect that most paradigm shifts are 
primarily mental constructions. Any new way of being in the 
world must necessarily be more than just an appealing 
ideology - it must be reflected in the day to day activities 
we engage in as teachers, as parents, as students, as 
citizens. With Hillman and Ventura, I feel we should engage 
less in the attempt to build a new theoretical 
superstructure than in the tentative articulation of a new 
theoretical framework: 
We're instigators, goaders, conceptual 
adventurers, if you like, through whom the new 
theoretical framework is putting out feelers, 
announcing itself •.. leaving cryptic notes in 
strange places (1992, p. 60). 
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I resonate with the images in these words - conceptual 
adventurers, with antennae finely tuned to shifting cultural 
signals. The idea_of leaving cryptic notes in strange 
places is more appealing to me than proclaiming the arrival 
of a new worldview. The latter seems distinctly modernist, 
replacing one theoretical superstructure with another, while 
the former is distinctly postmodern, hinting at the 
emergence of new ideas in the cracks and fissures of the 
modernist edifice. 
While this essay will examine some very Big Ideas, my 
primary focus is on the self, and its relationship to 
knowledge. The reconceptualization of the human subject, 
however, can not occur in a vacuum. Like Russian nested 
dolls, ideas about the self are enfolded in more general 
ideas of psychology, which are enfolded in even more 
encompassing scientific paradigms, which are in turn 
enfolded in a more general worldview. These ideas, as we 
shall see, are not causally related in any sort of 
hierarchical way. They are multidimensional and 
interpenetrating, with every sphere of experience 
influencing, and being influenced by, every other. Another 
image which describes this heightened connectivity quite 
21 
effectively is that of a web: if we imagine the 
intersections of the web to be the various aspects of 
reality (self, community, psychology, science, art, etc.), 
it is clear that all of the intersections are linked to all 
the others by connecting threads, additionally, when one 
intersection is disturbed, the entire web ''jiggles". It 
would be a gargantuan task to examine the entire web of 
contemporary reality, though Capra (1983) and Ferguson 
(1980) have certainly made heroic efforts to do just that. 
The purpose of this essay is much less ambitious. It is to 
explore just a few of the intersections and connecting 
threads of this web - those that connect the larger emerging 
framework of scientific inquiry to a specific psychological 
theory of the human subject. As a curriculum theorist, I 
remain intrigued by some primary questions about knowledge 
and the human subject: 
Where does knowledge come from? 
How do we know what we know? 
What knowledge is most important? 
What is the relationship between the knower and the 
known? 
These epistemological questions bring us continuously around 
to the fundamental ideas about what it means to be human, to 
think, to feel, to seek and to question. Our ideas about 
what it is to be human are intimately connected to ideas 
about nature and the cosmos. Our ideas about nature and the 
cosmos have shifted dramatically as a result of the 
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questions humans have asked of the world. You see? The 
questions we ask of the world give us knowledge of 
ourselves, which in turn influences the questions we ask of 
the world: 
In vague form, we begin to glimpse a conceptual 
framework in which each of us shares a paternity 
in the creation of physical reality (Zukav, 1979, 
P~ 91). 
It is a complex and intriguing construction of reality we 
are involved in - one which leads inevitably to paradox and 
ambiguity. The purpose of this thesis is not to resolve any 
of these paradoxes, but rather to develop a framework for my 
own curriculum theorizing that is consistent with 
contemporary intellectual currents. Embedded in this larger 
exploration will be an examination of the specific ways in 
which emerging ideas about the human subject influence our 
thinking about curriculum theory. 
In Chapter Two, I will take a look at the early 
twentieth century web of connections between science, 
psychology, ideas about the self, and curriculum theory. In 
that chapter, it will be clear that developments in 
curriculum theory were less than consistent with emergent 
ideas in science. In fact, it will be demonstrated that 
early curriculum thinking was based on a mechanical 
conception of reality that was already conceptually 
outmoded. More disturbing than that, however, is the 
conclusion that most of our curriculum thinking, especially 
its applications, are still grounded in such outmoded 
conceptions of reality. 
23 
In Chapter Three, I will look at three developments in 
science that have shaken loose the mechanical model of 
reality, and which have all raised important epistemological 
questions: the special theory of relativity, the theory of 
uncertainty, and the theory of chaotic systems. Each of 
these theories will be ex~mined for the ideas they generated 
about the relationship of the human subject to knowledge. I 
will also point out ways in which social scientists 
(including education researchers} have been overly 
enthusiastic in their extrapolations from these physical 
theories. 
In Chapter Four, "The Holistic Worldview and the Idea 
of Participating Consciousness", I attempt to weave together 
some emergent epistemological threads into a non-dualistic 
framework that is consistent with new ideas in science and 
which positions the human subject, as Hillman and Ventura 
suggest, in a "psychic field". To accomplish this, I have 
drawn upon the ideas of David Bohm (1987, 1983, 1976), a 
protege of Einstein's who has developed a comprehensive 
theoretical framework he calls the "implicate order". As we 
will see, this theory of the participatory nature of the 
human subject brings us back around to a reexamination of 
earlier organic philosophies of nature and human being. 
This shift from the modern to the postmodern scientific 
framework is as significant as the shift from the 
Aristotelian to the mechanistic worldview, and has been 
called by some theorists "the reenchantment of science" 
(Griffin, 1988). 
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In Chapter Five, I turn to the only psychological 
framework I have been able to find that can accommodate the 
transpersonal and cosmological implications of the "new 
physics". C.G. Jung's controversial and complex ideas of 
synchronicity and the collective unconscious, developed in 
collaboration with physicist Wolfgang Pauli, offer what I 
believe are the connecting links between the ideas of the 
"new physics" and theories of human cognition. This was 
both the most necessary and the most difficult theoretical 
leap for me to take. Necessary, because the new theories of 
physics are highly abstract and disconnected from ordinary 
experience, and for them to bring any meaning to the project 
of curriculum theorizing, I felt that they needed to be 
grounded in some sort of concrete referential reality. 
Difficult, because the conjoining of these ideas was no less 
than a personal transformation, effected by the convergence 
of two disparate aspects of my personal quest for knowledge. 
on the one hand, I have spent the last thirty or so years 
engaged in the study of consciousness through a sustained 
practice of meditation. While not always sure what the 
practice held for me, or exactly what it was I was learning, 
I was consistently compelled to keep at it, despite numerous 
external distractions. Throughout that time, I kept a 
fairly regular reco"rd of my dreams, a process I began when I 
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first encountered Jung's ideas as an undergraduate in the 
early 1970's. Unlike many of my mo:r:_e fortunate friends, who 
rest content with the wisdom of concrete experience and the 
contempla~ive life, I have been haunted by the need to 
rationally comprehend the non-rational experiences I have 
had - spending years or graduate study digging into various 
disciplines for illumination; transpersonal psychology, the 
philosophy of science, existentialism and phenomenology, 
curriculum theory. Unlike many other friends and 
colleagues, who have developed more elegant intellectual 
theories than I can ever aspire to, I am hopelessly 
inequipped to engage in theory-building that is not grounded 
in my own immediate experience. Had I been more susceptible 
to either the rational or the non-rational, this essay could 
have been written years ago. As it was, tugged equally by 
both, it was a long time in the making. 
While I have drawn some tentative conclusions for 
curriculum theorizing from the theoretical framework 
developed in these pages, I feel that I am just at the poine 
to begin to draw out t4e implications for teaching, 
learning, curriculum development ahd the education of 
teachers.· There are n9 shortage of existing ideas for the 
development of a more "holistic" curriculum and learning 
process. Ron Miller, in his book What Are Schools For?, 
details an historic educational movement which has its roots 
in the "perennial philosophy" described by Aldous Huxley 
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(1970), and which found its early expression in the Romantic 
philosophy of Jean Jaques Rousseau (1712 - 1778), the 
child-centered approach of Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi 
(1746-1827), the spritituality of Friederich Froebe! 
(1782-1852), the radical social criticism of the 
Transcendentalists (exemplified by the ideas of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson [1803-1882]), the radical anarchist critique of 
Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), and which .has found more 
recent expression in the Montessori movement, the Rudolph 
Steiner movement, and the work of practitioners and 
theorists whose writing has been featured in the pages of 
the Holistic Education Review (1988-present). While tpese 
historical and contemporary ideas have contributed to a 
vital "minority tradition" in educational thought, they have 
been largely grounded in Idealist philosophies and 
speculative metaphysics, which accounts for the limited 
influence they have had during an historical period 
dominated by empirical science and materialist idealogies. 
Thus, my efforts have been much more focused on articulating 
a theoretical foundation from which such a curriculum might 
emerge by reconceptualizing the human subject in light of 
new discoveries in science. This, 1 hope, might provide a 
rational justification for enlarging the scope of our 
thinking about human potential in general, and the 
educational process in particular. 
To study the Way is to study the self 
To study the self is to forget the self 
To forget the self is to be enlightened 
by all things 
To be enlightened by all 
things is to remove the 





EARLY SCIENTIFIC ROOTS OF CURRICULUM INQUIRY 
Historical Roots of Behaviorism 
Ideas about education do not develop in a cultural 
vacuum. They are profoundly influenced by dominant 
political ideologies, the structure of the economy, 
intellectual fashions, religious ideals and social mores -
influences which create a "network of assumptions" about 
human nature and needs, the process of knowing, the 
structure of knowledge, and the purposes of education~ The 
cultural roots of the technicist approach to curriculum 
practice in general, and curriculum inquiry in particular 
(variously termed the "positivist" (Bredo & Feinberg, 1982), 
the "theoretic" (Schwab, in Schubert, 1986, p. 314), the 
"conceptual-empiricist" (Pinar, in Schubert, 1986, p. 134) 
or the "social behaviorist'' (Schubert, 1986) established 
themselves in the fertile soil of a newly industrialized 
America, as it chugged and whistled into the 20th century. 
The rapid growth of manufacturing in centralized urban areas 
drew unprecedented numbers of families and laborers off 
farms and small towns and into the cities. Newly freed 
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slaves had moved North in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century to work in the factories. A huge wave of 
non-English speaking immigrants, mostly from southern and 
eastern Europe, arrived to fuel the engines of America's 
technological development. Enormous social problems emerged 
as the country attempted to assimilate masses of foreigners 
and former slaves into its wage labor system, and 
acculturate them to a value system based in Protestantism, 
democracy, capitalism and a new spirit of corporatism. 
Science, as we have seen, had achieved enormous 
success, due in large part to its systematic process of 
clearing away non-essential sensory data from the 
experimental arena. The focus on what could be easily 
measured had enhanced both its accuracy and its predictive 
power, as well as its utility. Faith in science was 
growing steadily, due to the rapid technological advances 
brought by its application. causal agents of disease had 
been isolated and curative chemicals proved effective in its 
control. Advances in communication and transportation 
technologies heralded a continuous growth in the standard of 
living. Expansion - growth - optimism - these were the 
descriptors of much of the American consciousness around the 
turn of the century. 
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Philosophical Roots of Behaviorism 
During this period, philosophers were engaged in an 
intellectual process that paralleled that of their 
scientific counterparts. A revitalized and resurgent 
philosophical realism emerged to challenge the orthodox 
Hegelianism prominent in most universities and clear away 
the metaphysical debris of Idealism. The well entrenched 
philosophy of Idealism, as it had been propounded by such 
thinkers as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Johann Gotleib Fichte 
(1762-1814), Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling (1775-1854) and 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1780-1831) was 
the elaboration and systematization of (the) basic 
proposition that mind is the primary and 
irreducible fact of individual experience .. that 
mind is prior; that when we seek for that which is 
ultimate in the world, when we push back behind 
the veil of immediate sense experience we will 
find that which is ultimate in the whole universe 
is of the nature of mind, or spirit 
1965, p.125) 
(Wingo, 
The central organizing principle of Idealism, despite the 
various forms it had assumed, was the principle of the 
priority of consciousness. G. Max Wingo summarizes the 
tenets of Idealism concerning knowledge and truth with the 
following four propositions: 
1. The universe is rational and orderly and, 
therefore, intelligible. 
2. There is an objective body of truth that has 
its origin and existence in the Absolute Mind 
and which can be known, at least in part, by 
the human mind. 
3. The act of knowing is essentially an act of 
reconstructing the data of awareness into 
intelligible ideas and systems of ideas. 
4. The criterion of truth for an idea is 
coherence; that is, an idea is true when it 
is consistent with the existing and accepted 
body of truth. 
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Idealism has historically been conceived as the 
"ancient and implacable enemy of all forms of materialism" 
(Wingo, p.126). It is consistent with the religious 
conception of human nature embodied in the Hebraic-Christian 
view of the world, in its conceptions of "Man" as the 
highest expression of the creative power of God; of a world 
which is a manifestation of Divine Intelligence; and of a 
human destiny which aims to unite the consciousness of Man 
with the Ultimate. But in_ this emergent and progressive new 
age of science and practical wisdom, consciousness was not 
of much interest to thinkers who were concerned with the 
measurable and the quantifiable. So, while scientists were 
busy clearing away the "noise" of extraneous sense-data in 
their laboratories, the" New Realists", as they came to be 
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called, were equally busy clearing away the epistemological 
remnants of Idealism. The battle, in the late 19th and 
early 20th century, between what had become a fairly 
orthodox Hegelianism and a revitalized philosophical 
realism, revolved around the speculative, system-building 
metaphysics of Idealism as opposed to the emphasis upon 
logic, commonsense and the scientific method espoused by the 
new realists (Wingo, p.162). 
The ideas of this dissident group were most fully 
articulated in a book entitled The New Realism (1912). 
Despite many differences of opinion, the New Realists held 
some basic tenets, or postulates in common. First, they 
posited the existence of a world independent of 
consciousness, in contrast with an Idealism that viewed the 
world as constructed by the subjective mind. This 
''principle of independence", stated that there exists 
a world of things and events and relations among 
these things and events, and this world is not 
dependent for its existence and character on its 
being known. 
(Wingo, 1965, p. 164). 
The other major thesis of realism is that we can know this 
independent world as it is, in its essential nature, at 
least partially. This proposition has generated a number of 
epistemological problems for realists of this century, but 
for the original insurgents, there was a general agreement 
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that we could know the world directly, in its real 
character. In other words, they perceived a direct 
correspondence between external objects and the thoughts or 
words we have about them, and further, they posited that no 
intervening mental construct, or state is necessary to 
account for this knowledge. The criteria for truth, within 
this framework, is whether or not an idea corresponds with 
the reality to which it refers: 
Knowing, then, is the uncovering of the realities 
(facts) that exist independently of their being 
known and truth is a property ideas have when they 
correspond to the realities to which they refer 
(Wingo, 1965, p.183). 
This "correspondence theory" was compatible with both 
common sense and the more refined empiricism of the 
scientific enterprise, and it is difficult to overstate the 
influence it has had upon the thinking of scientists, 
philosophers and educators of the 20th century. 
The New Realists solved some of the thorny problems 
that had been generated by dualism, with the development of 
a new theory of the mind. They discarded the notion that 
mind was a "thing" or special substance, located somewhere 
in the body. While acknowledging that some sort of 
structure (a nervous system) was essential for the 
functioning of the mind, they proposed that consciousness 
was rather, a process, which established a certain type of 
relation between an organism and the objects in its 
34 
environment. Inherent in this idea was the view that this 
mind/process did not exist simply in the organism, but is 
also out in the environment with the obj'ect of its 
perception. To sum up this admittedly sketchy treatment of 
an important philosophical development, then, this theory of 
consciousness eliminated the dualism between subject and 
object which had troubled philosophy from its inception, and 
provided an explanation for the view that our awareness is 
of an existing independent reality, rather than of a 
subjectively constructed one. More importantly for our 
purposes, this philosophical perspective was linked to a new 
development in scientific psychology, the behavioristic 
interpretation of consciousness. 
The Emergent Science of Behavior 
Ralph Barton Perry, a new realist, proposed an 
interpretation of consciousness which illuminated the 
connection between the new philosophical realism and the 
emergent science of behavior, which contained the following 
tenets: 
1. Consciousness and awareness are behaviors. 
Behavior is a process of reacting to 
stimuli. 
2. The presence of a stimuli presupposes the 
existence of an objective environmental state 
of affairs. 
3. Behavior is always "caused" - it is never 
spontaneous. 
4. The character of the response is a function 
of the nature of the situation (Wingo, 1965, 
p. 173). 
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Not all philosophical realists were inclined toward the 
behavioristic interpretation of consciousness, and many 
rifts _were to occur in this movement. Both intellectual 
developments, however - philosophical realism and the new 
science of behavioral psychology - were profoundly linked to 
the ever-increasing influence of mechanistic science on 
cultural life. Given the enormous success of this science 
in explaining and predicting natural phenomena, it was 
inevitable that it would finally turn to the field of human 
behavior. 
Physical Science and Behavioral Science 
When Idealism reigned as a dominant philosophical 
perspective, the traditional subject matter of psychology 
had been consciousness, or mind. Since the contents of the 
mind were private and subjective, it followed that the 
primary methodology for investigating its mysteries was 
introspection. This method of self-observation took a 
variety of forms which ranged from reporting immediate 
sensory impressions to the deep probing of emotional 
experiences. Descartes's observations of the relations 
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between nervous stimuli and mental processes, like many 
early psychological investigations, had both an empirical 
component and an introspective component. What 
distinguished this method, however, from the methods of 
physics, biology or chemistry was its subjective quality. 
Observations varied from observer to observer, in contrast 
to the general agreement that could be reached about what a 
number of observers might see in the test tube or under the 
microscope. By the second decade of the 20th century, the 
irreconcilable differences in the introspective reports 
issuing from psychological laboratories investigating 
identical questions convinced most psychologists that a 
genuine new science of the mind must be based upon the study 
of behavior (Woodworth & Sheehan, 1964, p.4). Behavior 
alone could provide the much needed external data about 
which different observers could agree, and by which theories 
could be validated. 
Just as the physics of Galileo in the 17th century had 
exerted a great influence upon the thinking of early 
psychologists such as Descartes and Hobbes, newly developed 
sciences in the 19th century had an influence on the 
emerging science of the mind. Philosophers (remember, in 
these days, philosophers and psychologists were just 
beginning to differentiate themselves), impressed with the 
achievements of chemistry, "sought to discover the elements 
of conscious experience and their laws of combination" 
(Woodworth & Sheehan, 1964, p.10). Even more influential 
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than chemistry however, was the flourishing experimental 
science of physiology, with its study of the sensory organs, 
nerves and brain, and indeed, the science of behaviorism can 
be said to have sprung from the attempt to unite psychology 
and physiology. The psychological laboratory sprung out of 
the physiological laboratory, and after the founding of the 
first psychological laboratory by Wundt in Leipzig, Germany, 
(in 1879), this new experimental science took off. 
While earlier psychologists had been satisfied with 
observations gathered from· memory and introspection, the 
experimentalists depended on definite recorded data of 
external events, and experiments were devised that met the 
stringent requirements of empirical science. Successful 
science, remember, depends upon the principle of uniformity 
- events must lend themselves to observation, classification 
and the expression of mathematical regularities. Laws of 
nature derived from these uniformities enable scientists to 
make predictions. There was great hope that all of the 
important problems of psychology would be solved by this 
methodology. 
Other developments in. the philosophy of science were to 
have a profound effect upon the development of a science of 
behavior. Physicalism, later termed operationism, was the 
view that 
Consciousness, as an object of observation by 
science, reduces to the operations by which 
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consciousness becomes known to scientists 
(Boring, 1961). 
The observed data then (whether a verbal or a motor response 
to a stimulus) upon whi'ch a theory of the mind could be 
built, could only be behavior. No longer could the 
subject's reconstruction of what went on in his 
'consciousness' be the primary datum for the experimentalist 
(Woodworth &_Sheehan, p.5). Logical Positivism, such as 
that promoted by the Vienna circle in the 1920's, also had 
an impact on this new science, with its attempt to eliminate 
metaphysics from the assumptions of philosophy. A.J. Ayer, 
one of the early logical positivists, developed what he 
called the "verification principle", that 
for a statement to be meaningful, it must be 
either purely definitional (analytic) or else 
verifiable (synthetic) by one or more of the five 
senses. All other statements (ethical, 
theological, and metaphysical statements) are 
non-sense, or meaningless (Geisler & Feinberg, 
1980, p.50). 
The logical positivism of the Vienna Circle then, relied 
upon an empiricism based on sense-data and observation, and 
a rationalism based on self-evidently clear and 
consequential arguments. All of these movements -
physicalism, operationism and logical positivism sought to 
purify the language of science, 
to rid science itself of the 11 pseudo-problems" 
which arise in the attempt to translate into the 
language of physical reality that which is itself 
unobservable or metaphysical or physically 
undemonstrable (Woodworth & Sheehan, p.4). 
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We sometimes forget, in this contemporary climate of 
critique of positivistic, empirical investigations, that 
positivism was originally conceived as a liberation from 
existing traditions. The phrase "positivism", coined by 
Auguste Comte, implied knowledge grounded in sensory 
experience rather than myth or metaphysics, facts which 
could be explained by general laws and integrated into 
coherent theoretical systems, and theories which were 
empirically testable with results which were reproducible. 
While it now seems apparent that this paradigm is far too 
rigid and narrow to provide an adequate understanding of how 
knowledge is constructed, at the time it seemed like the 
paradigm for true knowledge of the world (Bredo & Feinberg, 
1982) and of the human mind. 
Early Players in the Behaviorism Game 
Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1849-1936} was a Russian 
physiologist who was involved in the study of reflexes. 
Much of his understanding of the human mind and behavior was 
based on his experiments with dogs, in which he would apply 
40 
a neutral stimulus (such as a bell or a light) 
simultaneously with a stimulus (food) that was closely 
linked to a response (salivation). He found that if these 
stimuli were presented together a sufficient number of 
times, an "association" was formed, and further, that the 
association became stronger the more the paired stimuli were 
presented together. He believed that all organisms 
po~sessed two sets of reflexes: one; a fixed, innate set of 
relatively simple reflexes, and two; a set of acquired, or 
conditioned reflexes. All complex learned behavior, he 
contended, "is brought about through the combination of 
several simple conditioned reflexes, which are physiological 
- not mental - processes" (Rachlin, 1990, p.39). The 
relationship to the "chemistry model" is apparent here. 
Further, he believed that physiologists, through objective 
observations, would eventually be able to successfully 
predict the behavior of all organisms, including humans. 
This assumption was to have a powerful influence over the 
direction of the emergent discipline of psychology. 
The study of such "animal psychology", which focused on 
the comparison of instinctive (innate) behavior with 
behavior that occurred when an environment was modified in 
some way (acquired behavior), was interwoven with early 
studies in human psychology, behavior, child study and 
learning theory. In 1901, for example, Willards. Small 
published the first animal study which employed the maze. 
It was entitled "The Mental Processes of the Rat", and the 
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insights of subsequent experiments were applied to the study 
of childhood learning. 
In 1896, Edward L. Thorndike, one of the most 
influential behaviorists, had begun to experiment on 
children as part of his graduate studies at Harvard 
University. The authorities feared repercussions from these 
experiments, however, and "deprived of children, Thorndike 
turned to chickens"(O'Donnell, 1985, p.166), completing a 
classic study in comparative psychology entitled "Animal 
Intelligence". He based his subsequent educational and 
psychological theories on his animal researches, and was 
considered by Pavlov and the other Russian reflexologists to 
be the founder of behaviorism (Pavlov, 1923, preface). 
Thorndike's major contribution to learning theory was 
the notion (largely drawn from British "associationism") 
that all learning is the establishment of a bond between a 
stimulus and a resulting activity. His theory, labeled 
"connectionism", viewed Mind as the sum total of connections 
between situations which life offers and the responses that 
man makes (Joncich, 1962). He posited two general laws that 
related to this "stimulus-response" theory of learning, 
"Exercise" and "Effect". The notion of "Exercise" states 
that the more frequently a response occurs, the greater 
tendency there is for its repetition. The notion of 
"Effect" states that responses that have pleasurable 
outcomes have a "stamping in" effect which favors their 
reoccurrence, while responses that result in unpleasant 
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results are likely to be eliminated. It was not just the 
simple stimulus and its resulting response which was 
important to Thorndike, but the effects (of satisfaction or 
annoyance, for example) that followed, that were important. 
While Jeremy Bentham and o~her British philosophers had 
previously formulated the notion that humans tend to seek 
out experiences which provide pleasure and avoid those which 
inflict pain (Hill, 1963, p.57), Thorndike was the first to 
apply such "reinforcement theory" to the psychology of 
learning. 
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To Thorndike, it was the job of psychology to 
determine, through quantitative measurement of responses 
which incentives were the most powerful and productive. 
John Broadus Watson was another "animal experimen-
talist" who was a contemporary of Thorndike. His animal 
experiments have been considered "the chief causal agent in 
the birth of behaviorism" (O'Donnell, 1985, p.180). He too, 
argued that since it was impossible to verify introspective 
reports, the science of psychology should rely solely upon 
external behavior. It is difficult to overstate the 
influence of this early psychology on education. Indeed, by 
1910, over one-third of the psychological profession was 
interested in educational problems. 
Perhaps the most well known behaviorist of all, B.F. 
Skinner sought the answer to the question of what external 
events (stimuli and reinforcers) could produce desired 
behavioral responses (learhing). One of his major 
contributions was the idea of "frequency of responding" as a 
dependent variable, which became a major emphasis in 
educational research: 
In the decades that followed, results of research 
were reported in terms.of ratios and intervals and 
frequencies and curves, using running time meters, 
impulse counters, and cumulative recorders of 
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various kinds (Darling-Hammond & Snyder, 1992). 
Skinner's psychological ideas, and their connection to 
the control of individual behaviors and social organizations 
came to popular attention in his novel Walden Two (1948). 
The behavioral trend in psychology, the new realism in 
philosophy, an overriding interest in technical efficiency 
as it related to industrial production, and an interest in 
social control on the part of an emergent managerial class 
created a web of assumptions about human nature and learning 
that engendered what has come to be known as scientific 
curriculum planning, a curriculum "based on efficiency and 
standardization" (Doll, 1993). Early curriculum theorists 
such as Bobbitt, Charters, and Cubberly took their lead from 
the industrial model of activity. In 1916, educational 
historian Elwood Cubberly exemplified the aims, purposes and 
value base of mass schooling with the following statement: 
Our schools are, in a sense, factories, in which 
the raw products, children, are to be shaped and 
fashioned into products to meet the various 
demands of life ... this demands good tools, 
specialized machinery, and continuous measurement 
of production to see if it is according to 
specifications (p. 338). 
~his factory model of education perceived human beings as 
the raw material of production, specifying bits of 
information and skills as the manufacturing process and an 
obedient and productive worker as the finished product. 
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At this time; scientific management principles were 
being developed and applied to increase industrial 
efficiency. Frederick Taylor's studies of time and motion 
placed productivity in a central position, with the 
individual human being but, a cog in the production process. 
Work was analyzed, fragmented and reordered into the most 
efficient arrangement possible. This type of activity 
analysis, applied to education, became the foundation of 
early curriculum development. The mind, as well as the 
body, was harnessed to meet the increasing needs of capital. 
Around this time, Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon 
developed the first test that claimed to measure 
intelligence (Gould, 1981). This intelligence testing, 
combined with the analysis of the activities of various 
social groups, encouraged a differentiated curriculum based 
on the probable social destinations of students. W.W. 
Charters developed a curriculum for girls, based on their 
probable destination as homemakers and caretakers. Working 
class boys were trained for simple slots in the production 
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process through rote learning and discipline. Upper class 
boys were given the skills to become part of an emergent 
professional and managerial class. An overarching interest 
in social control demanded this sifting and sorting of 
students, all of it justified by dubious scientific 
assumptions about "innate capacities" and grounded in a 
general theory which understood social distinctions to be 
biologically ordained. 
/ 
Ralph Tyler (1949), known as the Father of Behavioral 
Objectives, further augmented the control of the learning 
process with a model of curriculum planning distinguished by 
an emphasis on clearly defined objectives, specified 
behaviors, and predictable outcomes. This model of 
educational practice is still very much with us, and while 
the factory model of education has been refined, it still 
guides much of our thinking. The metaphors found in much 
educational jargon are revealing: classroom management, 
v'efficiency, time-on-task, cost-effectiveness, input/output, 
~programming, feedback, objectives - language more suited to 
v'the production process than to human learning and 
development (Dobson, Dobson, & Koetting, 1985). 
In recent years, James Popham, UCLA measurement 
professor, inspired an increased dependence on standardized 
testing, evaluation and measurement-driven instruction 
(Jackson, 1992, p. 141) with his famous, or infamous 
(depending which side of the political fence you're on) 
quote "if it can be taught· and learned, it can be measured". 
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In the 1960's, Benjamin Bloom provided us with a rigidly 
ordered hierarchy of thinking skills, which educators are 
now expected to program into their lesson plans. In the 
1970's, Madeline Hunter rose to educational fame and fortune 
with her formulas which guaranteed predictable learning 
outcomes. The 1980's witnessed a preoccupation with the 
basics, and a wave of interest in "mastery learning", a 
reductionist model which focuses on the acquisition of ~/ 
discrete intellectual skills. The most recent educational 
trend is "Outcomes-Based Education", which according to 
originators Bill Spady and Kit Marshall, is a "new 
theoretical and operating paradigm" (1991, pp. 67-72), but 
which largely derives from Tyler's objectives-based model of 
curriculum development. Critics of these contemporary 
trends in education (Apple, 1992; Giroux, 1988; Kraft, 1993) 
suggest that these narrow, reductive approaches to 
curriculum mask a continuing interest in the control of the 
learning process and the elimination of less easily 
measurable outcome9 , such as critical literacy and 
intellectual open-mindedness. William Doll, in his (1993) 
book, A Post-modern Perspective on Curriculum suggests an 
even more significant theoretical problem - that the linear, 
sequential ordering of bits of information, the pre-set 
goals, the clear beginnings and definite endings, the 
dichotomous separation of ends and means, and the desire for 
control are 
embedded in the metaphysics of modernist science 
and in the scientism American curriculum thought 
has embraced (1993, p. 54). 
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Twentieth century curriculum theory then, is still grounded 
in a Newtonian science model that understands events as a 
narrow chain of-cause and effect, easily measurable if all 
the data about the system is available, and amenable to 
prediction and control. But postmodern science is no longer 
so certain about these assumptions, as we will see as we 
turn, in Chapter Three, to three modern.scientific theories 
that have shaken our epistemological assumptions. Just as 
the physics of Galileo in the 17th century had exerted a 
great influence upon the thinking of early psychologists 
such as Descartes and Hobbes, and as the newly developed 
sciences in the 19th century had an influence on the 
emerging science of the mind, postmodern science is exerting 
its influence on our maturing understanding of the human 
subject and the nature of knowing. 
CHAPTER I I I. 
SHIFTING WEBS: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT 
Einstein's Theories of Relativity 
One of the most profound by-products of the general 
theory of relativity is the discovery that gravitational 
"force", which we had so long taken to be a real and 
independently existing thing, is actually our mental 
creation ... The same is true for "nonsense". We call 
something nonsense if it d~es not agree with the rational 
edifices that we carefully have constructed. However, there 
is nothing intrinsically valuable about these edifices ... 
like measurements of space and time, the concept of nonsense 
(itself a type of measurement) is relative. 
Gary Zukav: The Dancing Wu Li Masters, pp. 
186-187. 
The 20th century revolution in physics, spurred in part 
by Einstein's development of the Special and General 
Theories of Relativity, produced important shifts in our 
assumptions about the nature of the physical universe, as 
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well as major consequences for scientific method itself. 
Challenges to the notion of purely objective truth have come 
from relativity, quantum theory and indeterminacy. One of 
the primary foci of the revoiution has been the reevaluation 
of the act of observation (Garrison, 1988). Gary Zukav 
perceives an "inevitable trend toward the merger of physics 
and psychology" (1979, p. 161), of which Einstein's 
development of the Special Theory o·f Relativity and the 
General Theory of Relativity were harbingers. I believe that 
while Einstein's process of discovery certainly laid the 
groundwork for such an assumption, Einstein himself would 
have maintained a narrower interpretation of the 
relationship between consciousness and sense-data than Zukav 
does. In this section of Chapter Three, I will explore the 
development of Einstein's theory of special relativity, 
examine relativity's challenge to objectivity, and attempt 
to make sense of the concept of nonsense. 
Assumptions of the Classical Theory of Relativity 
The Classical Theory of Relativity was supported by a 
number of commitments inherent in Newtonian physics. 
According to Newton, there was a universal and absolute time 
which flowed equably throughout the universe. There was a 
separate, independent and empty space which served as the 
background against which events took place, and time and 
space were separate entities. There was, somewhere in the 
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universe, an absolute, unmoving reference frame against 
which absolute motion might be measured. The classical 
theory of relativity asserted that the motion of a body 
could be calculated by adding or subtracting the velocity of 
the body to or from the velocity of its reference frame 
(depending upon direction), utilizing the "Galilean 
transformation laws". Additionally, classical relativity 
says that if the laws of mechanics are valid in one 
coordinate system, they are valid in any other coordinate 
system moving uniformly relative to the first. 
With his development pf the.Special Theory of 
.. --· 
Relativity, Einstein turned the world of physics upside down 
by demonstrating that the above commitments (largely 
grounded in common sense) were no longer "useful". 
Einstein's vision, in fact, has proven to be more useful 
than common sense (Zukav, p. 136). Let's examine the ways 
in which the Special Theory of Relativity overturned the 
commonsense notions of classical physics. 
Time and Space 
While Einstein utiliz~d classical relativity (based on 
Galileo's ideas) in the special theory, he added the 
assumption of the constancy of the speed of light (based on 
the Michelson-Morley experiment). If the velocity of the 
speed of light is the same in all coordinate systems, the 
assumption that all clocks have the same rhythm must be 
thrown out. Assuming the constancy of the speed of light 
implies that the measuring instrum~nts used will vary from 
one frame of reference to another depending upon their 
motion. A moving clock runs more slowly than a clock at 
rest, and continues to slow down until it stops altogether 
at the speed of light. "Motion itself causes contraction, 
and in addition, time dilation" (Zukav, 1979, p. 138). 
51 
Different theories-assess the temporal relation of 
events in different ways. Newtonian causality, one of the 
pillars of classical physical theory, was undermined by 
Einstein's assertion that the apparent cause of an event 
could be perceived as following the event, given certain 
high velocities and the motion and position of an observer. 
Einstein's focus was on the perceived order of events. The 
ramifications of this focus are explored in a 1957 study by 
Margenau & Smith (cited by Garrison), who argue that the 
vbarrier to establishing definitive causal relationships is a 
theoretical barrier and not a technological one. In other 
words, improved measuring instruments will not help because 
it is observation itself that generates the problem. 
Einstein's discovery of time dilation demonstrated that 
there is no universal time that permeates the universe, only 
"proper" times associated with various observers. Any two 
events that happen simultaneously in one frame of reference 
may occur at separate times from another frame of reference 
(Zukav, p. 145). The concept of temporality is 
theory-specific. This, according to Garrison, "undermines 
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any possibility of a superordinate concept of causality'' (p. 
132) . 
The concepts of space and time were collapsed in 
Einstein's theories. Space was no longer viewed as an arena 
in which events took place; rather, space-time is what is 
taking place. Matter does not take in space time, it 
distorts space time. 
Absolute Motion 
The classical assumption of an "ether", a motionless, 
invisible substance that permeated the universe, implied an 
absolute reference frame against which all motion could be 
measured. The entire structure of classical mechanics, says 
Zukav, "was based on the fact that somewhere, somehow, there 
must be a frame of reference in which the laws of classical 
mechanics are valid" (1979, p. 126). The ether, in addition 
to supplying a substance through which waves of light could 
travel, also supplied the co-ordinate system against which 
all things could be compared to determine whether or not 
they were moving. The crucial experiment of Michelson and 
Morley, however, rang a death knell to the theory of the 
ether, as well as leading to the development of the 
mathematical foundations of Einstein's theories. 
53 
How Theories Change 
As we have seen, two major conceptual roadblocks to 
developing the special theory of relativity were the 
existence of the ether (it was "nonsense" to think that 
wave-like structures could be propagated through empty 
space!) and the corresponding idea of absolute non-motion. 
Einstein discarded both of these theories because 
experimental data refused to confirm either one. He 
considered it "intolerable" to hang onto a theory which had 
no corresponding characteristic in our system of experience. 
The other important obstacle to radically reconceptualizing 
reality was the puzzle of the constancy of the speed of 
light. 
From the point of view of the classical theory of 
relativity, the constancy of the speed of light was 
"nonsense". Zukav defines nonsense as that which does note:,-/ 
fit into the prearranged patterns which we have superimposed 
on reality. It corresponds to the notion of "noise" (data 
which does not support a given theory) and Kuhn's 
"anomalies". If we experience something as "nonsense", says 
Zukav, we are experiencing' the boundaries of our own.._,.,// 
self-imposed cognitive structures. That the speed of a beam 
of light would not increase with the motion of its source 
defied common sense, upon which the theories of classical 
relativity rested. The way Einstein dealt with this puzzle 
was to disregard it as a puzzle and turn it into a 
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postulate, or a principle, which became the foundation of 
the special theory of relativity. He accepted the 
experimental data, gave up, the commonsense view and adopted 
/ 
a view which contradicted common sense (it was non-sense). 
With this conceptual leap, his perception of the nature of 
time and space was able to shift dramatically. 
While Einstein, in a sense, "started fresh" (Zukav 
calls this "having a beginner•·s mind") by reconceptualizing 
a puzzle as a principle, and by disregarding a physical 
theory which seemed to be the only possibility (light waves 
mus~ be propagated in something!), he clearly built his 
--
theories on the "rational edifices" of previous scientists. 
The constancy of the speed of light and the non-existence of 
the ether had previously been demonstrated in the 
Michelson-Morley experiment. The classical theory of 
relativity was not overthrown, but expanded to include the 
phenomena of electromagnetic radiation. And while his 
theories contributed to the overthrow of many assumptions of 
classical physics, Einstein stood on Newton's shoulders and 
refined his ideas (inertia/super-inertia). 
The way Einstein began the construction of his theory 
was with a thought experiment (the free creation of the 
mind). He then posited a new set of logical commitments (no 
ether, the constancy of the speed of light), worked out the 
math, then plugged it into, physical data. His story came v 
first, told him what to look for, suggested new and fruitful 
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lines of inquiry for scientists to follow, and was 
subsequently confirmed by numerous experimental results. 
When Zukav speaks of nonsense, he is developing Kuhn's 
premise that when data does not fit a prevailing conceptual 
schema, scientists tend to disregard such anomalies, or 
"noise": 
Our minds follow different rules than the real 
world does. A rational mind, based on the 
impressions that it receives from its limited 
perspective, forms structures which thereafter 
determine what it further will and will not accept 
freely. (1979, p. 160) 
Here, Zukav is in agreement with Kuhn that we are 
"socialized" into a particular conceptual framework which 
imposes its own interpretation upon the real world. Zukav 
is not suggesting that a conceptual framework, such as 
geometry, comes from the mind (as in Platonic Idealism). 
Rather, he suggests, idealizations abstracted from 
experience form rigid mental structures which cause us to~-
subsequently question the validity of sensory experience 
rather than the validity of the idealized abstractions. 
Zukav's continual reference, in The Dancing Wu Li 
Masters, to a "real world" suggests that he believes there 
might be an absolute reference frame, waiting to be 
discovered by a process of continuous deconstruction of 
self-imposed conceptual limits. This "breaking through" 
process, according to Zukav, is a description of the means 
by which Einstein achieved his theories of relativity. 
Einstein too, believed in a basic, underlying order to the 
universe - a fundamental truth waiting to be discovered. 
Whereas Einstein, however, sought the ultimate explanatory 
principle that would unify all of physics, Zukav seeks to 
take us beyond rationality altogether, beyond symbols and 
beyond science to a condition of pure experience, of the 
Buddhist notion of "that which is". 
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Both Zukav and Einstein seem to perceive the process of 
scientific discovery as an evolutionary process. This 
evolution, for Einstein, "is proceeding in the direction of 
increasing simplicity of the logical basis". Ironically, 
such simplicity can only be achieved by the increasing 
distance of theory from ordinary experience, and the 
increasing dependence upon complex and precise measurements. 
With more simple and more inclusive theories, previously 
disregarded data make "sense". "Nonsense is nonsense only 
when we have not yet found that point of view from which it 
makes sense" (Zukav, 1979, p. 117). 
It is one thing, howeyer, to posit the necessity for a 
more inclusive theory that will incorporate the "loose ends" 
of experimental data, and quite another to suggest that 
theories are arbitrary constructions of the human mind. I 
believe that Zukav overstates the case when he says that 
"there is nothing intrinsically valuable about these 
edifices". While theory, for Einstein, is "man-made", and 
I I~,' 
I ! 
arrived at by "free invention", it is "the result of an 
extremely laborious process of adaptation: hypothetical, 
never completely final, always subject to question and 
doubt". 
Though the theories of relativity were developed to 
explain limited instances of motion, scholars in many 
disciplines have played fast and loose with the theory. 
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With respect to epistemology, relativity is utilized to 
support claims that all observations are contingent upon the 
situation of the observer, and that observations must be 
meaningful and consistent in regard to the particular 
situation, or frame of reference. It has opened the way for 
a multiplicity of interpretations of a given event. Such 
interpretations are considered to be complementary, because 
they result in valid accounts of the phenomena, even though 
they may be incommensurable. I believe that Zukav would 
rest content with these conditions. I suspect, however, 
that Einstein is turning over in his grave! 
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle Revisited 
"Paradigm wars" in the social sciences do not so much 
involve competing interpretations of empirical data, as in 
the "hard sciences", but rather arguments over the 
admissibility of different types of data~ Until the 1950's, 
the standard positivistic, establishment, mainstream, 
objectivity-seeking and quantitative approach was undisputed 
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except by a handful of marginalized voices, such as that of 
Sorokin. Functionalism in sociology and behaviorism in 
psychology had the status of reigning paradigms, and 
education research drew upon one or the other, depending on 
whether the focus was on the system or the individual. In 
the late 1960's and early 70's, critical, dialectical, 
hermeneutical and nee-Marxian paradigms were promoted as 
alternatives to the prevailing neopositivist paradigm of 
quantification, hypothesis testing and generalization. This 
challenge has continued into the ao•s, with the notable 
addition of feminist theory and the refinement of 
qualitative, naturalistic research techniques. While the 
technical and methodological aspects of the confrontation 
have changed over time, deeper differences lie at the level 
of epistemology (Rizo, 1991, p. 10), and there is furious 
debate in social science research over issues raised by the 
"new philosophy of science'' (commonly understood as the 
implications of uncertainty, complementarity, relativity, 
chaos, non-locality and indeterminism). This section of 
Chapter Three will focus on the physical concept of 
uncertainty and its concomitant assumptions about the nature 
of the act of observation. 
Einstein's Theory of Special and General Relativity 
made great demands on the capacity for abstract thought, but 
according to Heisenberg (1930), it still fulfilled the 
traditional requirements of science (the division of the 
world into subject and object). It is at this level, 
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however, that the difficulties of quantum theory begin. In 
classical physics, the interaction between the observer and 
the observed object was considered negligible because of the 
scale of the operations. if not negligible, the effect 
could be eliminated from results with calculations based on 
control experiments. With the advent of quantum theory, 
this relationship becam_e problematic: 
Th°is assumption is not permissible in atomic 
physics; the interaction between observer and 
object causes uncontrollable and large changes in 
the system being observed because of the 
discontinuous changes characteristic of atomic 
processes (Heisenberg, 1930, p. 3). 
There are a number of justifications for the assertion 
that the observer influences, to a greater or lesser extent, 
the results of a quantum experiment. First, it is important 
to understand that there is no such thing as "quantum 
reality". Nothing can be said to exist, in the micro-world, 
until some form of measurement is applied to it. Sub-atomic~ 
particles have no existence independent of the blips, ticks, 
needle movements and interference patterns registered by the 
subtle and sophisticated instrumentation devised to detect 
(create?) them. The ability to select which attribute will 
be measured constitutes, according to Nick Herbert (1985, p. 
134), a significant component of the idea that an observer 
can be said to "create reality". Electrons, says Herbert, 
have no dynamic attributes of their own - what they have 
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depends upon how we choose to analyze them. In other words, 
you can slice up a wave any way you wish! This notion has 
been interpreted to mean that the unobserved attributes of 
the quantum world exist in an attenuated state of 
potentiality until an act of observation promotes some 
aspect of it to full reality status (this brings to mind the 
well known Zen koan about the reality status of a tree which 
falls in the forest with no one to hear it). 
Secondly, the Uncertainty Principle is commonly 
understood to refer to the degree of indeterminateness in 
calculating the simultaneous values of a variety of paired 
quantities. It in no way restricts the exactness of a 
measurement of either of the partners' in- such a pair. 
Margenau (1957,p. 361) terms the individual aspects of such 
correlated observables as position/momentum, time/energy and 
angle/angular motion "canonically conjugate". The common 
characteristic of all canonically conjugate pairs is that 
the product of their physical dimensions has the dimension 
of action, and for all such pairs, the uncertainty principle 
holds. 
The most commonly cited example concerns the velocity 
and position of a free electron. If the velocity is 
precisely known, the position is unknown. Why? In order to 
locate an electron with precision, you must use gamma rays, 
the light wave of the shortest wave length. Such a light 
wave has the largest frequency and great momentum. The 
photon emitted to strike the electron acts like a swift 
projectile, communicating momentum to the electron, thus: 
Every subsequent observation of the position will 
alter the momentum by an unknown and 
indeterminable amount such that after carrying out 
the experiment, our knowledge of the electronic 
motion is restricted by the uncertainty relation 
(Heisenberg, 1930,p. 20). 
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Conversely, to measure the momentum, the photon bullet to be 
reflected must have a small momentum and a large wavelength, 
hence: 
... the accuracy as to position conveyed by a 
signal of large wavelength is small, for certainly 
the reflecting object cannot be located in a space 
smaller than a single wave (Margenau, 1957, p. 
3 68) • 
In summary, the measurement of certain paired 
quantities inevitably sacrifices one form of precision to 
gain another. This is not a measurement problem that can be 
solved with improved technology because the problem is 
inherent in the act of measurement itself. Every experiment 
of this sort destroys some of the knowledge of the system 
which was obtained by previous experiments. The uncertainty 
principle does not refer to the past - the position of an 
electron for any times previous to the measurement may be 
calculated, but this measurement can't be used as the 
initial condition for the calculation of future progress of 
the electron (because of changes in momentum caused by the 
measurement of its position). 
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The co-existence of two seemingly contradictory quantum 
effects (the perfect accuracy of quantized attributes and 
the mutual uncertainty of conjugate attributes) troubles 
philosophers more than it troubles physicists. Most 
physicists are pragmatists, and the predictive power of 
quantum theory has been demonstrated in thousands of 
replicable experiments. 
The inequality sign in position/momentum equations has 
created the impression, according to Margenau, that one 
never quite knows what the uncertainties are, even when the 
incremental changes are well defined. Such ignorance, he 
says, is spurious, for the uncertainty axiom tells how to 
calculate the distribution, and hence the standard deviation 
when the state function is given. The epistemological 
doctrine of quantum theory then, has merely moved from the 
classical notion that a single observation could determine 
the kind of knowledge needed for prediction to the 
incorporation of statistical uncertainty. into its equations. 
It 
relates the state of atomic systems to an 
aggregate of datal experiences and not to a single 
complex called one measurement (Margenau, 1957, p. 
363) • 
It is ironic that a concept such as uncertainty, arrived at 
through a painstaking inductive approach via selected 
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experiments, should provid~ such an i~portant foundation 
stone of the postpositivist critique of empirical, 
quantitative research in the social sciences. A recent 
(April 1989 - May 1991) series of articles in the 
prestigious journal, Educational Researcher, highlights the 
arguments over the usefulness of utilizing Heisenberg's 
Uncertainty Principle in social science research, and I turn 
now to some of the wider elaborations of the theory. 
Unpredictability. Uncertainty and Indeterminism in Hu.man 
Behavior 
A recurring theme in educational discourse throughout 
the past two decades is a debate over epistemology. The 
debate centers around qualitative vs. quantitative 
approaches to research. Various arguments are presented to 
support the notion that human behavior is essentially 
unpredictable and indeterm1nate. A number of researchers 
have utilized the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle to 
support a naturalistic, ethnographic, or qualitative 
research agenda (See Goetz & Lecompte, 1984; Guba, 1981; 
Guba & Lincoln, 1982; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Patton, 1980; 
Piel, 1978; Tranel, 1981). 
The most obvious critique of the use of the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle to challenge the "rationalistic 
p·aradigm" is the fact, cited by McKerrow & McKerrow, that 
V 
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"the principle was discovered in the context of the 
rationalistic paradigm" (1991, p. 17). It is inappropriate, 
they assert, to use the principle to negate the paradigm 
within which it was discovered and utilize it to defend a 
competing paradigm. Tranel (1981), goes so far as to 
suggest that the Uncertainty Principle asserts that "one can 
no longer speak of certainty and predictability and 
measurement in the area of the physical sciences". Nothing· 
could be further from the truth. Sub-atomic physics is an 
incredibly accurate measurement system, within a 
statistically accurate realm of probability. McKerrow and 
McKerrow further critique some popular assumptions of the 
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle: a) that there is 
uncertainty in everything and b) that the observer changes 
what is real. They agree with Hofstadter {1985, p.465), who 
asserts that quantum mechanical reality does not correspond 
to macroscopic reality. While this critique corresponds 
with the dominant view among physicists, there is no clear 
agreement about what constitutes the dividing line between 
micro and macro systems. While Cziko (p. 22) concedes that 
at the macro level, quantum effects generally cancel each 
other out, he cites a couple of examples in which the 
separation between the two spheres is less than obvious. 
One is the role of sub-atomic particles in genetic mutation, 
the other is the possibility that random individual 
electrons could cause a computer malfunction. And as he 
reminds us, we can only speculate at this time about the 
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role of quantum randomness in cognitive processes. 
Generally speaking however, the Uncertainty Principle covers 
the simultaneous measurement of paired quantities. While 
its influence has been tremendous, in that its restrictions 
changed physics to a probabilistic science, there is nothing 
inherent in the principle to suggest that it applies to 
macroscopic phenomena. 
In social science res!=arch,. the observer affects what . 
is observed in numerous ways. The choice of variables to 
include in the study, the values and biases of the 
researchers, the level of interference in the activity being 
studied all influence the results of social inquiry. The 
idea of indeterminacy, as developed by Quine, arises within 
the attempt to assign meanings to the behavior of 
individuals and groups culturally different from the 
researcher. Explanations of behaviors must remain 
indeterminate, because the researcher brings already 
established linguistic and conceptual frameworks to the task 
of understanding. Concepts of meaning and reference are 
"empirically empty" (Miller & Fredericks, 1991, p. 5), 
unlike scientific theories, which can be assessed more 
objectively, hence their susceptibility to 
underdetermination. But this conceptual indeterminacy has 
nothing to do with the more specific kind of measurement 
difficulties covered by the Heisenberg Principle. 
Contenders on the qualitative side of the social 
science research debate challenge the tendency of 
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quantitative researchers to build theoretical models and 
construct macro-level generalizations. They criticize these 
tendencies for a number of reasons. First, models can lead 
to an overemphasis on form, at the expense of the subject 
matter itself. Second, models oversimplify the complex 
relations between various forms of behavior. Third, models 
overemphasize rigor at the expense of essential details. 
(Miller & Fredericks, 1991, p. 18). Most supporters of a 
qualitative approach, such as Cziko, propose an expanded 
notion of research - an essentially descriptive and 
interpretive approach that "proliferates rather than 
narrows", and -captures the; compiexi ty' of·· human behavior. 
The conflict reflects a much wider debate in the field of 
scientific endeavor - that between those who would narrow 
the field of study to achieve precision, and those who would 
sacrifice some rigor for the inclusion of a wider range of 
phenomena. The debate harks back to the beginning of the 
Scientific Revolution, when Galileo first applied 
mathematics to simple physical phenomena. It is a plea for 
an Aristotelian conception of "practical wisdom" and 
contextualized inquiry - a rebellion against the abstraction 
and mathematization of (human) nature. 
Quantum theory has contributed conceptually to this 
movement in significant ways. It has reinforced the 
awareness that "because our descriptions rest upon human 
constructs that fit our perceptual limitations, they can be 
neither wholly adequate or exhaustive" (McKerrow & McKerrow, 
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1991, p. 20). Its wave/particle duality has enabled us to 
dwell more comfortably with ambiguity and paradox. 
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle is an intuitively 
coherent met~phor for the pi;fficulties of. isolating 
phenomena to capture a precise measurement, and for the 
difficulties inherent in making accurate predictions. But 
as is generally the case when social science attempts to 
graft concepts from physical science on to its theoretical 
structure, more is extrapolated from it, in my opinion, than 
is warranted. It can provide us with the necessary 
perspective for appreciating a qualitative approach, but it 
is probably "bad science" to apply it directly to the 
problems of social inquiry. 
Chaos Theory And Self-Orgc1:nizing Systems 
"that in the shadowless atmosphere, · 
the knowledge of things lay round but unperceived" 
Wallace Stevens 
If relativity theory caused us to discard the Newtonian 
illusion of abs~lute time and space, and quantum theory 
eliminated the Newtonian dream of a controllable measurement 
process, then chaos eliminates the Laplacian fantasy of 
deterministic predictability (Gleick, 1987, p. 6). Chaos, 
says Alvin Toffler, "is a lever for changing science itself, 
for compelling us to reexamine its goals, its methods, its 
epistemology - its world view" (in Prigogine & Stengers, 
1984, p. xii). At its core, mathematical chaos theory, or 
non-linear dynamics, represents "new theoretical tools 
(which) illuminate the order that lurks beneath seemingly 
random and impenetrable behavior in nature" (Reiter, 1984, 
p. 11). Scholars in fields as diverse as physiology, 
mathematics, physics, medicine, meteorology, chemistry, 
economics, neuroscience, climatology and literature have 
embraced this new paradigm. Why the enormous 
interdisciplinary interest in a new mathematical model? 
What are the philosophical implications of this new model? 
And what might it mean for research in curriculum? 
From Reductionism to Chaos 
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The history of ideas, and the major thrust of the 
scientific effort represents the quest to discover an 
underlying order or unity in the universe. Confronted with 
the "messiness" and apparent disorder of material 
phenomenon, scientists hav~ engiied ih a·process of 
isolating phenomena and reducing them to their simplest 
components for analysis. The trend in reductionism has been 
to proceed with the analysis of systems in terms of the 
parts. 
Within this mode of operation, irregularities, 
fluctuations and anomalous behaviors have been dealt with in 
various ways. Often they are "shoved under the carpet" -
ignored until enough of them pile up to become a nuisance. 
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Sometimes they can be resolved within the existing paradigm, 
or conceptual framework. If this is impossible, scientists 
will attempt to modify the paradigm in some way (this is 
referred to as "tinkering", an appropriate mechanical 
metaphor for this endeavor). Theories are adjusted, 
replaced or modified, but the fundamental conceptual 
framework remains in place. None of these ways of dealing 
with anomalies, or "noise", require a radical rethinking of 
basic concepts, or an adjustment of the tacit infrastructure 
of ideas. Sometimes a sufficient number of anomalies 
accumulate, or the few that there are,become insistent 
enough that a scientific crisis ensues, and a radical 
revision in the existing conceptual framework is called for. 
This constitutes what Thomas Kuhn (1962) has termed a 
"scientific revolution", and during such a period, 
scientists experience a restructuring of group commitments, 
or a transformed view of knowledge. 
Such a revolution seems to be occurring with the advent 
of the new sciences of complexity. The science of the 
"global nature of systems" posed problems that defied 
accepted ways of working in science. The old reductionist 
model no longer seemed to apply to the solution of problems 
f . . . . 
inherent in systems, such as weather, the flow of turbulent 
fluids, and certain physiological problems, such as those 
connected with the fibrillating heart. Until recently, the 
most that scientists could say about such systems was that 
they were too unpredictable arid complicated to understand. 
Recently, however, new light has been shed on the elements 
of randomness inherent in such systems, and this intense 
scientific scrutiny has yielded up a new dimension in 
understanding complex systems. 
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A primary assumption of Newtonian physics is that given 
the approximate knowledge of the initial conditions of a 
system, and an understanding of natural law (which in this 
framework is thought to be both universal and eternal), one 
could calculate the approximate behavior of a system. 
Indeed, modern science has pursued the dream of eighteenth 
century mathematician-philosopher Pierre Simon Laplace, who 
gave voice to the vision of strict determinism: 
The present state of the system of nature is 
evidently a consequence of what it was in the 
preceding moment, and if we conceive of an 
intelligence which at a given instant comprehends 
all the relations of the entities of this 
universe, it could state the respective positions, 
motions and general affects of all these entities 
at any time in the past or the future. 
Laplace, 1776 
(in Crutchfield, et.al., 1986) 
Here, Laplace introduces the concept of "reversibility" (the 
idea that, in a mechanistic universe, events can be traced 
deterministically backwards in time, as well as forwards). 
Even Laplace~ ·however, who' in Gleick'~ (1987) words, had 
"caught the Newtonian fever like no one else", admitted 
difficulties in the application of this idealized 
determinism: 
But ignorance of the different causes involved in 
the production of events, as well as their 
complexity, taken together with the imperfection 
of analysis, prevents our reaching the same 
certainty about the vast majority of phenomena. 
Thus there are things that are uncertain for us, 
things more or less probable, and we seek to 
compensate for the impossibility of knowing them 
by determining their different degrees of 
likelihood. So it is that we owe to the weakness 
of the human mind one of the most delicate and 
ingenious of the mathematical theories, the 
science of chance or probability. 
Laplace, 1776 
(in C~utchfield, et.al., 1986) 
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From Lap~ace's point ~f view., it,was only the 
limitation of human conception that caused the appearance of 
randomness -if only humans possessed the omniscient 
perspective of the Deity, the exact causes of all events 
could be known, and the future could be accurately 
predicted. While the verdict is far from in on the 
existence of "hidden variables", chaos theory has challenged 
some of the core assumptions of this Newtonian world view. 
Coupled with the revelation from quantum mechanics that 
initial measurements are always uncertain, 
chaos ensures that the uncertainties will quickly 
overwhelm the ability to make predictions. 
Without chaos Laplace might have hoped that errors 
would remain bounded, or at least grow slowly 
enough to allow him to make predictions over a 
long period. With chaos, predictions are rapidly 
doomed to gross inaccuracy. (Crutchfield, et al., 
1986, p. 49) 
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At the root of this indeterminacy is a simple discovery 
that even rudimentary deterministic systems with only a few 
. 
elements often generate random behavior. This notion is 
related to what has been called the "butterfly effect" - a 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions in which tiny 
differences in input can become major differences in output. 
According to Crutchfield, et al., "this randomness is 
fundamental; gathering more information does not make it go 
away" (p. 46). In other words, the appearance of 
randomness, spontaneity or surprise in systems is not due to 
the inadequacy of human perception. It is rather, inherent 
in many systems themselves, leading chaos theorists to speak 
of such internal, systemic dynamics as "self-organization", 
"temporali ty"; "complexi tyi•,. "equilib~ium"' "coherence", 
"instability" and "irreversibility". Matter, in this 
framework, "is no longer the passive substance described in 
the mechanistic worldview but is associated with spontaneous 
activity" (Prigogine, 1984, p. 9}. 
This is a genuine conceptual departure from the 
Cartesian-Newtonian view of inert particles colliding with 
each other in empty space,, governed by immutable laws set 
down in the beginning of creation by an external, Divine 
intelligence. In the mechanistic model, 
The universe is, therefore, one, infinite, 
immobile ... It does not move itself locally ... It 
does not generate itself ... It is not 
corruptible ... It is not alterable. 
Giordana Bruno 
(in Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p. 15) 
-The worldview suggested by chaos theory more resembles the 
animated, organismic view of the pre-scientific world than 
it does the clockwork empire of the Enlightenment. We do 
not, however, have to choose between the disenchanted, 
alienated world of Newtonian science and the irrationality 
of the pre-scientific, or anti-scientific worldview. 
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Science, says Prigogine, is enchanted - not because of a 
concern with magic, or the unimaginable, but because they 
are beginning to understand the complex processes that form 
the world (1984, p. 36). 
The ambiguity with which we must deal, however, is that 
{this chaos is deterministic, governed by fixed rules that do 
\not involve elements of chance. Evidenced by the striking 
\ \and elegant geometrics of yisual fractal forms, there is 
~ndeed, underlying order in chaos, and while this emergent 
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science does imply fundamental limits on predictability, it 
also indicates that many random phenomena are more 
predictable than we used to think. 
So where does this leave us in our analysis of the 
implications of chaos, not only for scientific research, but 
for philosophical ideas such as determinism, free will,· 
human intentionality and conscious intelligence? The dream 
of_the founders of classical science - to go beyond the 
world of appearances to reach a timeless world of supreme 
rationality -has been seriously challenged. Chaos, 
according to Prigogine, suggests that we may have unveiled 
·
11 a more subtle form of reality that involves both laws and 
games, time and eternity" {1980, p. 215). Newtonian science 
is a revealed science, alien to any social or historical 
context which might identify it as a result of human 
activity. The postmodern perspective sustained by chaos 
theory, on the other hand, perceives events as temporal, 
-
historical and context-specific, and nullifies the classical 
scientific effort to discern timeless eternal cosmic laws. 
Yet, with the temporality and self-organization, chaos also 
reveals an elegant underlying order lurking beneath 
phenomenal appearances. The order, however, is inherent in 
the phenomena rather than imposed by an external Divine 
intelligence. 
One of the more important revelations of chaos theory 
lies not in the model itself, but in the process by which it 
was discovered. Chaos could have been discovered long ago, 
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according to early developers of the theory (Doyne Farmer, 
-James Crutchfield, Robert Shaw and Norman Packard), but 
scientists had limited their observations of physical 
systems to experiences that fit an existing conceptual 
framework. These men found, however, that when they moved 
outside the parameters of what had been studied, they found 
things to which the huge existent body of analysis didn't 
apply: 
It brought home the point that one should allow 
oneself to be guided by the physics,·. by 
observations, to see what kind of theoretical 
picture one could develop. 
(Packard, in Gleick, 1987, p. 251) 
The implication here is that theory should emerge from 
observations, rather than provide a rigid conceptual 
framework that guides and limits observations. This of 
course, is what is known in the social sciences as "grounded 
theory" and is a common assumption of ethnographic, 
hermeneutic and other forms of qualitative research. It 
provides a more open-ended approach to theory-building and 
knowledge construction, on~ that attempts to remain, as much 
as possible, free from prior conceptualization. As David 
Bohm and F. David Peat make clear in Science, Order and 
Creativity (1987), much of scientific activity is no longer 
concerned with direct sensation. Pre-existent theories 
guide perception, and interaction with the world is mediated 
76 
by elaborate technologies that have been devised on the 
basis of these theories. Furthermore, the questions that 
scientists ask generally come not from sense data, but from 
an existing body of knowledge. Bohm and Peat suggest, and 
the chaos theorists might concur, that science would be 
better served with a more creative form of perception, 
rather than one which is rigid and theory-bound, and by 
allowing the scientific mind "free play" (fluid movement 
between and among concepts, assumptions, observations and 
abstractions). This process would allow uninhibited 
observation, shifting perspectives and a much more tenuous 
relationship with cherished paradigmatic suppositions. 
There are a number of reasons why chaos theory has 
captured the popular imagination, as well as the interest of 
so many scholars in so many different fields. Unlike 
general and special relativity, which find their application 
in macro/cosmic phenomena, or quantum mechanics, which 
relates specifically to micro-phenomena, chaos theory 
actually applies to the visible, human scale - the world of 
objects we can see and touch. The general interest in 
unpredictable and evolving systems may reflect a general 
sense that humanity is in a transition period. Some 
theorists and cultural commentators find support for the 
notion of rapid, or punctuated evolution in Prigogine's 
- ' .: 
theory of dissipative structures, and seek corresponding 
explanations for biological, cultural, social and 
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psychological transformations in it. Aquarian Conspiracy 
author Marilyn Fergusen finds Prigogine's theory of 
dissipative structures analogous to the radical 
transformation of society by a group of creative, dissident 
individuals. She quotes Prigogine: 
Fluctuations, the behavior.of a small group of 
people, can completely change the behavior of the 
group as a whole (p. 166}. 
She goes on to say that 
Critical perturbations~ "a dialectic between mass 
and minority" - can drive the society to "a new 
average" ... Societies have a limited power of 
integration ... any time a perturbation is greater 
than society's ability to "damp" or repress it, 
the social organization will (a) be destroyed, or 
(b) give way to a new order (p. 166). 
Indeed,·we find ourselves in an historical moment in 
which many systems have either collapsed or are teetering on 
the brink of breakdown. Global ecological crises include 
warming trends, the loss of the ozone layer, deforestation, 
species extinction, pollution and soil depletion. Systems 
of national identity have become highly unstable with the 
collapse of Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. Social systems in many cultures have 
splintered along issues of race, religion, social class, 
ethnicity and gender. The planet certainly appears to be in 
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a "far-from-equilibrium" state (Prigogine's term for systems 
extraordinarily sensitive to small fluctuations). Chaos 
theory suggests that we might view such an historical period 
as one of "breakthrough" rather than "breakdown" - that 
despite the suffering and disorder prevailing, humanity may 
well be "self-organizing" in creative and unpredictable 
ways. In the Chinese Book of Changes (the I Ching), the 
hexagram BEFORE COMPLETION comes at the very end of the 
book. It represents a transition from chaos to order, and 
points to the fact that every end contains a new beginning. 
This hexagram, and the theory of chaos, offer humanity a ray 
of hope during a period of general despair. 
Another reason why chaos theory has captured our 
imagination is the challenge it offers to the discouragement 
of "entropy". One of the key themes of chaos theory is the 
reinterpretation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics - in 
fact it offers a synthesis of the paradoxical conditions of 
entropy and evolution. According to the laws of entropy, 
the universe is losing energy, "winding down" into 
increasing disorganization and homogeneity. But according 
to evolutionary theory, life is proceeding from the simple 
to the complex, from undifferentiated to differentiated 
structures. "The universe gets 'better' organized as it 
ages, continually advancing to a higher level as time sweeps 
by" (Prigogine, p. xx). According to Prigogine and 
Stengers, 
entropy is not merely a downward slide toward 
disorganization. Under certain conditions, 
entropy itself becomes the progenitor of order 
{Gleick, p. xxi). 
The disorderly behavior of simple systems thus acts as a 
creative process - it generates complexity: 
... richly organized patterns, sometimes stable and 
sometimes unstable, sometimes finite, and 
sometimes infinite, but always with their 
fascination of living things (Gleick, p. 43). 
Science, at long last, tentatively embraces, rather than 
scorns the messiness, complexity and apparent disorder of 
nature. 
Some interpretations of chaos suggest that it is 
capable of healing the deep historical schism between 
science and the humanities. In part this is because the 
theory lays to rest the quest for all-embracing schemas, 
universal frameworks and immutable laws in favor of a 
perception of nature that is changing toward the multiple, 
the complex and the temporal: 
When me move from equilibrium to 
far-from-equilibrium conditions, we move away from 
the repetitive and the universal to the specific 
and the unique (Prigogine & Stengers., p. 13). 
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Chaos then, resonates with a postmodern consciousness that 
favors the particular over the universal, quality over 
quantity, perpetual movement over rest, the concrete over 
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the abstract, and culture-bound principles over the timeless 
and eternal laws sought by the founders of modern science. 
The political and cultural implications of this are 
enormous, and beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to 
say that power is intricately connected with and dependent 
' ' 
upon idealized and objective forms of knowledge. Chaos 
theory appears to have had an effect similar to relativity 
and quantum mechanics, in that one of science's own 
discoveries has had the affect of challenging some of its 
own categories. 
Chaos may indeed sign~l "the end of the reductionist 
program in science" for many scientists (Gleick, 1987, p. 
304), but it certainly does not spell doom for the 
mathematization of nature. It is a sophisticated 
mathematical model, which lends itself extremely well to 
computer applications .. There are problems, however, with 
mapping the human world onto mathematical structures 
developed to describe the mechanical world of physical 
objects - whether it be that of celestial mechanics, 
statistical mechanics, continuum mechanics or quantum 
mechanics. Those problems derive from the mathematization 
process itself: 
So when we map the human world onto the 
mathematics arising in the world of mechanics, the 
human world can only look mechanical. The 
structures we employ to express ourselves, 
literally to 'push out' our thoughts onto these 
symbolic structures, do not allow this human world 
of ours to look anything else except mechanical 
(Gould, 1988, p. 16) .. 
Chaos may be, as Gleick says, reshaping the fabric of 
the scientific establishment, but its value for curriculum 
theorizing probably lies more in its generative metaphors 
than in its mathematical models. 
Chaos and the· Curriculum· 
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As indicated in Chapter 2, much of curriculum planning, 
instruction and inquiry is embedded in a mechanistic world 
view. The behaviorist model of learning and the technicist 
approach to curriculum inherited from Bobbitt, Spencer, 
Tyler and other founding fathers of curriculum all posit a 
view of the learner as a "closed system". In a closed 
system (such as a rock or a log), there is no internal 
transformation of energy. An open system, on the other 
hand, might be described as a "flowing wholeness" (Fergusen, 
1980, p. 164); involved in· a continuous exchange of energy 
with its environment, highly organized, and in a continual 
process of becoming. The old paradigm of learning, which 
finds contemporary expression in the Madeline Hunter model, 
mastery learning and outcomes-based education proposes a 
narrow range of predictable learning outcomes, specified 
behaviors as both means and ends of those outcomes, limited 
and controlled inputs of information and an emphasis on 
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educational 11!)roducts" (me!llorized facts, written reports, 
right answers). It has been remarkably successful at 
turning students into rocks and logs. At the core of the 
technicist approach to education is the belief that (human) 
nature is wild, uncontrolled and chaotic. It has therefore, 
demonstrated a continual effort to impose order where none 
is thought to exist. This ontological assumption about the 
nature of being drives many of our educational decisions. 
If we begin to reconceptualize human nature, or being, in 
terms of new understandings i~ complexity, a clearly 
different understanding of the learner and the learning 
-- process might emerge. Chaos theorists speculate about the 
nature of mind, expanded beyond a simple input-output model: 
At the pinnacle of complicated dynamics are 
processes of biological evolution, or thought 
processes .•. In the development of one person;'s 
mind from childhood, information is clearly not 
just accumulated but also generated - created from 
connections that were not there before (Packard, 
in Gleick, 1987, pp. 261-262). 
This begins to sound a bit like constructivist learning 
theory, and indeed, educational thinkers including Piaget 
have been drawn to the study of self-organization. Piaget 
understood the development of mental schemata to be the 
result of cognitive disequilibrium in the face of novel 
environmental circumstances and the resulting accommodation 
and assimilation that provided for adaptive changes. 
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According to curriculum theorist William Doll, Piaget's 
theories w-ere limited to assertions that development could 
not be rushed, that development occurs via internal 
mechanisms of action, and that when such development does 
occur, it happens in a sudden manner,'with disequilibrium 
acting as a positive force (1993, p. 102). Doll has taken 
the curriculum implications of these theories further than 
did Piaget, and suggests that within the new model of 
reality generated by chaos theory, curriculum might rightly 
be conceived as a "process~: 
not of transmitting what is (absolutely) known but 
of exploring what is unknown (1993, p. 155). 
Learning and understanding, he says, are "constructed", 
rather than "transmitted", through dialogue and reflection, 
and he suggests that 
curriculum's role, as·process, is to-help us 
negotiate these passages (between ourselves and 
others); toward this end it should be rich, 
recursive, relational, and rigorous (p. 156). 
Teachers and students should be free, Doll suggests, to 
develop their own curriculum in conjoint interaction with 
one another, to "self-organize" within their own situational 
parameters. His new vision of curriculum questions 
traditional assumptions about authority and epistemology, 
challenging both the "spectator theory of knowledge" (that 
reality is apart from us and is waiting to be discovered) 
and the analytic mode that, governs our epistemology and our 
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pedagogy, and argues for a constructivist relationship 
between the knower and the known (p. 168). The questions he 
raises and the challenges he presents us with are 
far-reaching and significant. I believe however, that his 
conceptualization of the hum.an subject, while moving toward 
a postmodern perspective, contains remnants of modernist 
threads in its fabric. His relational, constructivist 
subject, still sounds more, like Dewey:s autonomous, 
problem-solving (in community) self than like Grumet•s "I as 
a stream of possibilities" or deep ecology's "self as a 
momentary configuration of energy, a local perturbation in a 
complex flow pattern" (Kesson, 1990). Doll's 
interpretations of postmodern science still place human 
beings at center stage, a problematic position from an 
ecological perspective, and fall short of situating us in a 
"psychic field" (as suggested by Hillman and Ventura, in 
Chapter One). Generative then, as the ideas of chaos theory 
and complex systems has been to our thinking about 
curriculum., it is to the work of David Bohm, a physicist and 
protege of Einstein's, and his theory of the "implicate 
order" that we will now turn, in order to extend Doll's 
notions of ''interaction" as the key to a postmodern 
curriculum, to the idea of "interpenetration", a theoretical 
step which I believe radically challenges the notion of the 
human subject as autonomous individual. As well, it takes 
us beyond the idea of constructivism to even more 
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' speculative assumptions about the source and authority of 
knowledge. 
CHAPTER IV. 
THE HOLISTIC WORLDVIEW AND PARTICIPATING CONSCIOUSNESS 
Educational ideas are embedded in particular ontologies 
and systematic philosophical traditions. We earlier 
examined two extremely influential philosophical systems 
that have had consequences for educational thought, Idealism 
and Realism. Idealism, which was discussed at some length 
in chapter two, represents the 
elaboration and systemization of (the) basic 
proposition that mind is the primary and 
irreducible fact of individual experience (Wingo, 
1965, p. 125). 
When we push back the veil of sensory experience, according 
to the tenets of Idealism, we find that which is ultimate in 
the universe to be Mind. So - the central conception of 
Idealism is the principle of the priority of consciousness. 
Though it is difficult to generalize about such a complex 
and differentiated tradition, most idealists are 
committed to the belief that there is a body of 
truth, that this truth can be known, and that it 




The primary responsibility of education then, to the 
Idealist, is the apprehension and incorporation of value in 
the student's life, and the acquisition of value is 
primarily a matter of learning and assimilating our ethical 
heritage. 
Realism, as we have seen, gave rise to a somewhat 
different understanding of educational methods and purposes. 
The technical, input-output model documented in chapter two, 
for example, is grounded in materialist assumptions that 
understand the human mind as a "blank slate" (Locke's 
"tabula rasa") upon which the environment writes its story. 
This commonsense view of the mind notes that sense organs 
convey stimuli from objects to our minds, and that this data 
furnishes raw material for the cognitive processes of the 
mind to act upon. While the Idealist then, sees 
consciousness as prior, privileging subjectivity as a 
primary determinant of human knowledge and behavior, the 
realist sees the material world as prior, with consciousness 
an "epiphenomenon" of the lnteraction'of·matter and form. 
Both of these perspectives neglect the full range of 
.. 
experience that influence thought and behavior. Both have 
supported essentially conservative educational ideas. 
Idealism has been identified with the cultural transmission 
model - the "Great Ideas" school of educational theory, 
while realism has supported a narrow, technical approach to 
the acquisition of information. Getting beyond these 
classic dualisms, not to mention reconceptualizing the 
resultant educational ideas has presented difficult 
philosophical and practical problems. 
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In the remainder of this chapter, I will attempt to 
delineate the emergent form of a new philosophical 
conception of the human subject, a holistic perspective 
which offers a reconciliation of the Idealist/Materialist 
dilemma and suggests unanticipated dimensions of human 
experience. As we-will see, this framework begins to 
resemble pre-scientific, animistic ideas, ironic in light of 
their emergence from the processes of the most sophisticated 
sciences. This exquisite ~ance of the premodern and the 
postmodern has generated the notion of "reenchantment" - of 
the world (Berman, 1984) of science (Griffin, 1988), and, I 
would add, of the human subject. This notion of 
"reenchantment" is an intriguing one, suggesting a shift 
from a paradigm of fragmentation to a paradigm of 
interconnection, interdependence, and interpenetration. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I will try to tease out the 
implications of these concepts. 
Holism as •Nested Order• 
Holism as a philosophical alternative to mechanism was 
first proposed by Smuts in his book Holism and Evolution 
(1926), in which he proposed a continuum of relationships 
among parts from the simple to the complex, in which the 
unity among parts was affected by and changed by the 
synthesis: 
Holism is a process of creative synthesis; the 
resulting wholes are not static, but dynamic, 
evolutionary, creative ... The explanation of nature 
can therefore not be purely mechanical; and the 
mechanistic concept of nature has its place and 
justification only in.the wider setting of holism 
(Merchant, 1980, p. 293). 
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Smuts' original premise, as well as recent developments 
in physics, biology, and ecology, -concede the explanatory 
power of the holistic perspective in the study of physical 
systems. The holistic conceptual framework becomes somewhat 
more problematic when human conscious~ess is brought into 
the equation, however. 
Physicist Paul Davies, commenting on the extremes of 
dualism represented by materialism (the idea that humans 
behave mechanically in response to external stimuli) and 
Idealism (the idea that the physical world does not exist -
that all is perception), suggests that 
many of the old problems of dualism fall away once 
it is appreciated that abstract, high-level 
concepts can be equally as real as the low level 
structures that support them, without any 
mysterious substances', or ingredients ( 1983, p. 
83) . 
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The mind, says Davies, is holistic, and exists at a higher 
(more complex), but equally "real" level of organization 
than the neurons of the brain. This two level description 
of the mind and the body improves on the old Cartesian idea 
of mind and body as two distinct substances. This mind-body 
continuum of experience, with no clear dividing point 
between the two spheres, corresponds to Bohm and Peat's idea 
that there is a hierarchical "nesting" of ranges of complex 
orders, "some of infinite degree which contain embedded 
within them many orders of lower degree" (1987, pp. 
128-129). They utilize the written novel as an analogy for 
this idea of nested order, with its infinitely rich and 
complex order of language and its various suborders of 
tense, syntax, action, character, and plot. These suborders 
are complex, but interdependent, as they both condition and 
are conditioned by, the overall pattern and flow of the 
novel. 
The whole/part relatipnship beco¥les central to this 
holistic model of reality, and the idea of "synergy" plays 
an important role. Holism, according to historian Morris 
Berman (1984), 
holds that a collection of entities or objects can 
generate a larger reality not analyzable in terms 
of the components themselves; that the reality of 
any phenomenon is usually larger than the sum of 
its parts (p. 353). 
A contemporary educational scholar, Ron Miller, writing on 
holism, tells us that 
Holistic thinking is concerned with relationships, 
with contexts, with meaning. It is an inclusive 
worldview, a phenomenological approach to human 
experience which takes seriously the multiple 
natural, cultural, social, moral, and spiritual 
environments within which human existence is 
situated. Given this frame of reference, holistic 
thinking is radically nonreductionistic; it aims 
to bridge dichotomies between mind and matter, 
' individual and society, humanity and nature by 
seeing such pairs asdynamic relationships rather 
than logically opposed categories. (1992) 
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As we can see from these descriptions, holism is a 
"macro-concept", "distinguished by a compelling impulse 
toward unity" (Kesson, 1991, p. 45). These ideas challenge 
a centuries-old concern with a purely reductionist approach 
to understanding reality. In the eagerness to overcome the 
reductionism that has dominated the scientific endeavor, 
however, some scholars are embracing older, Idealist 
positions. Roger Sperry, Nobel Laureate, writes in a paper 
entitled Changing Priorities: 
Current concepts of the mind-brain relation 
involve a direct break with the long established 
materialist and behavioralist doctrine that has 
dominated neuroscience for many decades. Instead 
of renouncing or ignoring consciousness, the new 
interpretation gives full recognition to the 
primacy of inner conscious awareness as a causal 
reality (quoted in Griffin, 1988, p. 116) 
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Indeed, the scope of our methods of understanding reality is 
expanding, and "the traditional concern with prediction, 
control and the analysis of parts (has been subordinated to) 
a new concern for the way the unpredictable whole of things 
moves (Briggs and Peat, 1989, p. 29). The crucial question, 
I believe, is whether we can move into this new "holistic" 
paradigm without stepping into the metaphysical quagmire 
associated with Idealism~ 
Implications of the ·New Physics• for Theories of 
Perception 
As we saw in chapter three, many of the ideas that have 
come to us from the "new physics" have challenged the 
primary underlying assumptions of a long-held mechanistic 
view of the universe. With Einstein's Special and General 
Theories of Relativity, 
the idea of a time that flows uniformly across the 
universe was called into question, for it was 
shown that the notion of the flow of time depends 
on the speed of the observer (Bohm and Peat, 1987, 
p. 108). 
Even though these theories only applied to macroscopic 
systems, moving at the speed of light, the ideas can be said 
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to have contributed to a postmodern movement away from 
absolutist thinking toward the notion that things are 
relative, and dependent on contexts and conditions. 
Uncertainty, as a fundamental component of quantum theory, 
has led directly to the consequence of unpredictability. 
This uncertainty, confirmed by Alaine Aspect in the Paris 
experiment of 1982, is not the result of inadequate 
information (as Newtonian science would have us believe) but 
is intrinsic to the microworld of quantum mechanics. Chaos 
theory has caused us to rethink our ideas of randomness and 
determinism, seeing them as not necessarily incommensurable, 
but as coexistent within more inclusive general notions of 
order. The Newtonian worldview of absolute time and space, 
stability, clockwork order and predictability has 
surrendered to a science and a worldview characterized by 
temporality, specificity, transformation, and spontaneity. 
This dynamic new outlook on the universe, says physicist 
Illy Prigogine, is characterized by the reintroduction of 
diversity, and therefore the.unexpected (Weber, 1987). 
New perceptions of the human subject, as participant in 
this postmodern world, have arisen as a result of this new 
web of understanding generated from the study of physics. 
Quantum theory, says Zukav, 
not only is closely bound to philosophy, but also, 
and this is becoming increasingly apparent - to 
theories of perception (1979, p. 305). 
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The implications, says Talbot (1986), "of quantum theory 
will profoundly change our understanding of ourselves and 
our role in the universe ... equally important is its ability 
to transform the way we think" (p. 38). Numerous twentieth 
century physicists have addressed this relationship between 
physics and consciousness. Classical notions of "scientific 
objectivity" rested upon the assumption of an external world 
of nature existing "out there" opposed to an "I" which is 
"in here". The task of the scientist has traditionally been 
to observe the "out there". objectively, free of prejudices. 
The point of view that we can be without a point of view is 
itself a point of view, however, and both quantum mechanics 
and postpositivist social inquiry have called the notion of 
objectivity into question. Whether we are engaged in 
particle collision experiments or classroom observations, we 
can not eliminate ourselves from the picture. "We are part 
of nature", writes Zukav (1979), "and when we study nature 
there is no way around the fact that nature is studying 
itself" (p. 31). 
Paul Davies tells us that the quantum theory 
forms a pillar in what has becom~ known as the new 
physics, and provides the most convincing 
scientific evidence yet that consciousness plays 
an essential role in the nature of physical 
reality (1983, p. 100). 
According to Neils Bohr:., the fuzzy quantum mechanical world 
of atomic reality is only brought into focus when an 
observation is made - reality, in other words, only 
materializes when you look for it! Davies again: 
The commonsense view of the world, in terms of 
objects that really exist 'out there' 
independently of our observations, totally 
collapses in the face of the quantum factor {1983, 
p. 107). 
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In. 1979, John Wheeler claimed that "the precise nature of 
reality has to await the participation of a conscious 
observer (Davies, 1983, p. 111). John Gribben speculated 
that nuclei and positrons did not exist prior to the 
twentieth century (since no one ever saw one) - rather, 
"they were brought into existence by our conception of them" 
(Wallace, 1989, p. 89). And in Heisenberg's words, 
What we observe is not nature itself, but nature 
exposed to our way of questioning {Capra, 1975, p. 
12 6) • 
These are powerful arguments for the notion that our 
conceptualizations of the physical world, what we in fact 
can know about the world, is not only influenced by, but is 
in a significant way determined by, our conceptual framework 
(our theories), as well as by the instrumentation we bring 
to the study. Our conceptual frameworks are influenced by a 
host of complicating factors: perceptions, neuronal 
connections, habits of mind (conditioning), biases, and 
perhaps most important, language. Science, indeed, both 
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shapes and is shaped by our concepts about the world. We 
are led inescapably to the necessity of the inclusion of the 
study of consciousness in the study of nature, but this 
issue raises all of the difficult philosophical questions 
raised in chapter one: 
Where does knowledge come from? 
How do we know what we know? 
What knowledge is of most importance? 
What is the relationship between the knower and 
the known? 
The Subject/Object Resolution 
The new physics challenges us to think beyond the usual 
framework that posits knowledge as something "out there" to 
be assimilated by a knower "in here": 
The common division of the world'into subject and 
object, inner world and outer world, body and 
soul, is no longer adequate (Heisenberg, in 
Davies, 1983, p. 112). 
The world appears more and more to be not a collection of 
separate, but loosely coupled "things" but a complex, fluid 
and dynamic network of relations. Clearly, our old concepts 
are no longer adequate - but just what might this 
unanticipated unity of science and human experience suggest? 
Is the world really becoming "reenchanted"? 
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Physicist David Bohm is one of a number of scientists 
who have challenged the long held reductionist views. 
Bohm's ideas "give a scientific shape to the ancient belief 
that 'the universe is one' (Briggs and Peat, 1989, p. 29). 
The separate parts of the universe, writes Bohm, 
are seen to be in immediate connection, in which 
their dynamical relationships depend, in an 
irreducible way, on the state of the· whole system 
(and indeed, on that of broader systems in which 
they are contained, extending ultimately and in 
principle to the entire universe). Thus, one is 
led to a new notion of unbroken wholeness which 
denies the classical idea of analyzability of the 
world into separately and independently existent 
parts (in Zukav, 1975; p. 297}. 
Bohm's thesis is that the mechanistic science which 
reduced matter to ever smaller units governed by external 
force is giving way to a science based on the primacy of 
process. Energy and relationship, in this paradigm, become 
more significant than discrete entities, and Bohm argues for 
a physics based on this new order. All describable events, 
objects and entities are but abstractions "from an unknown 
and undefinable totality of flowing movement" (1980, p. 49), 
an unbroken wholeness which Bohm calls the "implicate order" 
(from the Latin root meaning "to enfold"}. This implicate 
order is the unmanifest field of energy, a realm of 
possibility and potential which he contrasts with 
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the"explicate" (manifest} order with which classical physics 
has been primarily occupiea. Like a hologram, the implicate 
order is thought to have information distributed throughout 
the system. What is truly revolutionary in this new 
paradigm of perception and experience is the related idea 
that all of the potential information about the universe is 
"holographically encoded in the spectrum of frequency 
patterns that constantly bombard us" (Wilber, 1982, p. 148), 
and that through attunement with this frequency pattern, the 
human brain can access patterns of meaning and unitive 
consciousness. This idea will be explored more fully in the 
final chapter, for I believe it holds the key to a genuine 
transformation in our thinking about the': learning process. 
Reality, in this framework, is described as the constant 
movement of form from the implicate, or unexpressed order, 
to the explicate, or expressed order. Bohm calls this 
dynamic process the "holomovement", suggesting a revaluation 
of our notions of non-rational states of awareness, and a 
fluidity of perception more reflective of older, more 
organic modes of understanding. This process physics, like 
Whitehead's cosmology, "tends to see the basic unit of 
reality as an 'occasion' which is constantly in the process 
of transformation and change" (Oliver, 1989). 
Bohm proposes a new form of .insight_based on this 
notion of "unbroken wholeness", an insight that recognizes· 
the sea of unqualified energy that backgrounds all manifest 
forms as well as the connections between the manifest and 
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the unmanifest orders. The greatest human illusion, 
suggests Bohm, is the mistaking of the manifest, static, and 
fragmented content of consciousness for the basis of 
reality, and the simultaneous denial of the more transitory 
features of the unbroken flow. This fragmented 
consciousness, which "treats things as inherently divided, 
disconnected, and 'broken up into yet smaller constituent 
parts" (1980, xi) is at the core of our fragmentary 
worldview, which is itself at the core of the numerous 
social, ecological, cultural, personal and intellectual 
crises that plague the modern world. Bohln emphasizes the 
importance of "destructuring the thinker", a process that 
would enable consciousness to flow unhindered between the 
explicate and the implicate orders, enabling us to "think 
coherently of a single, unbroken, flowing actuality of 
existence as a whole, containing both thought 
(consciousness) and external reality as we experience it" 
(ibid, x). Woven through his critique of rationality as a 
limiting form of perception is this theme of movement: 
Thus the sharp break between abstract thought and 
concrete immediate experience that has pervaded 
our culture for so long, need no longer be 
maintained. Rather the possibility is created for 
an unbroken flowing movement from immediate 
experience to logical thought and back, and thus 
for an ending for this kind of fragmentation 
(Bohln, 1980) 
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Ecological Thinking and the ·New Physics• 
The picture of contemporary physics revealed by Bohm's 
notion of an "implicate order" complements an emergent 
ecological worldview, "drawing mutually consistent and 
mutually supportive abstract pictures of nature in its most 
elementary and universal and its most complex and local 
manifestations (Callicott, 1989, pp. 51-52). Bohm's 
holistic field theory resembles that of eco-philosopher 
Arnie Naess,·who says that;deep·ecology suggests a 
"relational total field image (in which) organisms (are) 
knots in the biospherical net of intrinsic relations 
(Callicott, 1989, p. 58). The implicate order-corresponds 
to the 'relational total field image', while the explicate 
order suggests the "knots in the net'. The individual, or 
the human subject, in this ecological context, is a 
momentary configuration of energy, a local perturbation in a 
complex flow pattern. Or from Rorty's philosophical 
perspective, "it is to substitute a tissue of contingent 
relations, a web which stretches backwards and forward 
through past and future time, for a formed, unified present, 
self-contained substance, something capable of being seen 
steadily and whole" (1989, p. 41). Self, says Bohm (1976), 
is but "an abstraction from a whole movement, which thus has 
only a certain relative similarity or constancy of form and 
pattern of behavior" (p. 60). These images certainly do 
provide an imaginative alternative to the Cartesian psychic 
monad, encapsulated in a hostile and alien material sheath 
and locked in a bitter str~.1ggle with a material world 
tempting him ever away from his "true essence". 
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While an understanding of the organic connectedness of 
biological life is an important emergent awareness, Bohm's 
theories go beyond this to propose that consciousness, 
which he takes to include thought, feeling, will and desire, 
is to be comprehended in terms of this implicate order also 
(1980, p. 196). ·Here is where the boundaries between the 
self and the "other" really begin to break down. Again, 
let's turn to the discipline of eco-philosophy to explore 
this idea. 
Ecologist Paul Shepard suggests that the relational 
concept of the self "extends to consciousness as well as 
organism, to mind as well as matter" (Callicott, 1989, p. 
63). From a "deep ecological'' (the philosophical, as 
opposed to the resource management} perspective, the 
boundaries between self and other become blurred with the 
awareness, mentioned before, of the body as a momentarily 
stable configuration in a vast sea of fluctuating energy 
patterns. Notions of separation become even more untenable 
when we understand that the structure and content of the 
psyche have evolved, as Shepard suggests, through 
interactions with rock, plant, sea, sky and animal. John 
Seed suggests a developmental framework for the maturation 
of ecological thinking when he says 
there is an identification with all 
life ... alienation subsides ... 'I am protecting the 
rain forest' develops to 'I am part of the 
rainforest protecting itself' ... to 'I am that part 
of the rain forest recently emerged into thinking' 
(Callicott, 1989, p. 64). 
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This kind of.thinking represents a genuine convergence of 
the isolated subject and the object of perception, an almost 
mystical unification induced by full participation of the 
knower with the known. No less than this is called for by 
David Bohm. If we continue to think of the world as 
separate from ourselves, he says, "constituted of disjoint 
parts to be manipulated with the aid of calculations", as in 
the Cartesian paradigm, we become separate, alienated 
beings, whose main motivation toward each other is control 
and manipulation. But if we perceive 
an intuitive and imaginative feeling of the whole 
world as·constituting'an implicate order that is 
also enfolded in us, we will sense ourselves to be 
one with the world ... we will feel genuine love for 
it (Griffin, 1988, p. 67) 
The whole world, according to Bohm, "is internally related 
to our thinking processes through enfoldment in our 
consciousness" (ibid, p. 67}. It requires a quantum leap 
for us to begin to think that the human mind might possibly 
encode all of the information, holographically, that is 
available in the universe. It would certainly lay to rest 
the "tabula rasa" (blank slate) theory of the mind forever. 
Older, Absolutist ideas would fall by,the wayside too, as we 
103 
come to understand the dynamic and ever-shifting qualities 
of the relationship between the implicate and the explicate 
order. Bohm's ideas raise a whole host of philosophical, 
empirical, and theoretical issues to be solved, but like the 
theories of relativity, uncertainty, and chaos, his ideas 
provide enormous explanatory power because of their 
inclusivity. One of the key issues in this new paradigm is 
the development of a psychology adequate to the 
r . . . . . 
transpersonal and cosmological dimensions of the theory. 
And so, we turn, to chapter five, to some of the more 
promising investigations into the realms of human experience 
suggested by this holistic, participating worldview. 
CHAPTER V 
ENTERING THE MYTHOPOETIC:RECONCEPTUALIZING 
MIND IN A HOLISTIC UNIVERSE 
... the human kingdom, beneath the floor of the 
comparatively neat little dwelling that we call 
our consciousness, goes down into unsuspected 
Aladdin caves. There not only jewels but also 
dangerous Jinn abide: the inconvenient or resisted 
psychological powers that we have not thought or 
dared to integrate into·our lives ... 
(Campbell, 1972, p. 8} 
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In her recent {1992} book, Women Who Run With the 
Wolves, Clarissa Estes, a contemporary psychoanalyst and 
storyteller, introduces us to "t:_he mythic entity, "La Laba", 
an archetypal personification of the 'old wise woman beyond 
time' who stands between the worlds of rationality and 
mythos. Assuming various mythic forms through the centuries 
(Mother Nyx, Ourga, Coatilique, and Hecate}, this archetypal 
feminine energy serves as a "feeder root to an entire 
instinctual system" (Estes, 1992, p. 29}, mediating between 
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the cthonic realm of the psyche and the 'upper world' of the 
ego. swiss psychologist C.G. Jung termed this locus between 
the worlds the "psychoid unconscious" and considered it "a 
place where t~e biological,and tne psychological share 
headwaters, where biology and psychology might mingle with 
and influence one another" (Estes, 1992, p. 31). In more 
poetic terms, Estes, a Jungian analyst, describes this 
mythic dimension as 
the place of the mist beings where things are and are 
not yet, where shadows have substance and substance is 
sheer (1992, p. 30). 
In Jung's topography of consciousness, the La Loba archetype 
occupies a central role in the dialectic between the 
conscious mind and the unconscious, forging a dynamic link 
between the social self, or 0persona".and the subterranean 
streams of desire, dream, prehension, fantasy and 
imagination. This conversation between the various layers 
of the psyche, which Jung documented in many of his patients 
long after they were "cured" in the ordinary sense of the 
word, is central to what he called the "individuation 
process". I understand "iridividuation" as a process of 
exploration in which unincorporated aspects of the psyche 
(Jung referred to these as the "shadow") are brought to 
light, making whole what was fragmented: 
To be whole means to become reconciled with those sides 
of personality which have not been taken into 
account ... no one who really seeks wholeness can develop 
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his intellect at the price of repression of the 
unconscious, nor, on the other hand, can he live in a 
more or less unconscious state (Fordham, 1966, p. 77) 
In a 1974 paper entitled "A Transcendental 
Developmental Theory of Education", curriculum theorist 
James Macdonald suggested that the appropriate psychological 
attitude for the coming age would be "a psychology of 
individuatioi,•i . (p. 176). .. '. -Macdonald was intrigued with the 
psychology of Jung, eschewing more narrow empirical and 
developmental views that led away from our ontological 
ground of being. In this chapter, I will begin by 
elucidating the more important aspects of Jung's complex 
depth psychology, then pur9ue Macdonald's idea that the 
notion of "individuation" should be considered in what he 
called the "transcendental developmental ideology". I will 
explore the connection between the movement "toward the 
integration of inner and outer reality in a meaningful 
wholeness" (Macdonald, 1988, p. 182) and Bohm's "undivided 
wholeness in· flowing movement" (1980,"p.· 11). I will look 
briefly at two of the writings that deal specifically with 
the relationship between physics and consciousness: the 
first, a text co-authored by C.G. Jung, the psychologist and 
Wolfgang Pauli, the physicist, called The Interpretation of 
Nature and the Psyche, in .which Jung explored the idea of 
synchronicity as an important new category for scientific 
investigation; the second, physicist Fred Wolf's study of 
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the relationship between shamanism and physics. Finally, I 
will conclude with speculation about what these ideas might 
mean if we were to seriously consider them in our thinking 
about teaching and learning. 
Jung's Structural Model of the Psyche 
Jung was at one time an avid student of Freud's work, 
then later an enthusiastic colleague and supporter of his 
ideas. In the beginning of their association, Jung was a 
respectable m~mber of the ~urope~n psychiatric establishment 
while Freud was suspect for his highly speculative ideas 
(Singer, 1973, p. 84). A decade later, Freud was recognized 
as a giant in the world of psychology, Jung was dismissed as 
a speculative philosopher, and their relationship had 
disintegrated. The split occurred largely as a result of 
Jung's most original and still controversial discovery -
that of the collective unconscious. Whereas Freud viewed 
the unconscious primarily as a dark repository of suppressed 
infantile sexual impulses, Jung came to understand it as a 
vast and fertile reservoir of archaic images and primal 
impulses, 
a kind of infinite area within man (sic), a spaceless 
space ... more primal, more archaic, more primordial 
still than materiality (Progoff, 1973, p. 166). 
This aspect of the psyche has remained largely elusive to 
reductive analysis, because it is, for the most part, out of 
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reach of intellectual formulations. Jung acknowledged the 
difficulty of apprehending the totality of psychic 
experience through the intellect, and recognized that he had 
tapped into an area of human experience with which science 
was largely unequipped to deal: 
the individual imagines that he (sic) has caught the 
psyche and holds her (sic) in the hollow of his (sic) 
hand ..• He is even making a science of her in the absurd 
supposition that the intellect, which is but a part and 
function of the psyche, is sufficient to comprehend the 
much greater whole (Singer, 1973, p. 371). 
Reference to this "Ground of Being" (the totality of psychic 
experience) is found in the collection of traditions termed 
by Leibniz the philosophia perennis, which contains the 
historical record of mystical experience· '(Huxley, 1944) . 
However, some of the most systematic empirical 
investigations into this realm of experience come to us from 
the analysis of dreams begun by Jung in the early part of 
the century, and carried on by analysts of that tradition. 
Though these studies suffer from all the complexities and 
ambiguities of earlier studies based on introspection (see 
Chapter two), the huge quantity of data gathered by Jung 
during his many years of investigation revealed certain 
universal structural qualities of consciousness. 
The structure of the psyche deduced by Jung can perhaps 
best be apprehended with the:help of a visual image. If we 
can imagine the collective unconscious (the inherited 
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psychic substratum prior to personal experience) as the 
ocean; the ego (defined by Jung as "the complex of 
representations which constitutes the centrum of my field of 
consciousness and appears to possess a very high degree of 
continuity and identity" (Progoff, 1973, p. 72) as the 
visible tops of islands; and the personal unconscious (lost 
memories, repressed ideas,;subliminal,perpeptions, etc.) as 
the wet and sandy shoreline that connects individual 
experience with the undifferentiated substratum of psychic 
experience, we can begin to get a sense of the complexity of 
his model. Jung perceived these various categories of 
consciousness as having "permeable barriers" in that the 
material from the "ocean" of the unconscious continually 
laps at the shores of the ego, reshaping and reforming its 
terrain, conversely, aspects of personal consciousness are 
washed down into the undifferentiated depths of the psyche. 
Jung claimed the "Self" as a sort of organizing center, 
the totality of the psyche (distingui~hed from the ego, 
t . . • 
which only constitutes a small part of it) (Jung, 1964, p. 
162), and suggested that this "Self" (originating as "inborn 
possibility") performs a regulating function between the 
unconscious and the ego that brings about the extension and 
maturing of the personality. This notion of the Self 
appears to correspond with.various mystical concepts - the 
Greek "Daimon", the Egyptian "Ba-Soul, or the Hindu "Atman" 
(Jung, 1964, p. 162). Jung came to understand this 
regulatory function of the Self on the basis of his study of 
over 80,000 dreams. The process of analysis developed in 
this theoretical framework concerned itself with the 
constant interplay between consciousness and the 
unconscious, with the 
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bringing (of) order out of disorder, purpose out of 
aimlessness, and meaning out of senselessness {Singer, 
1973, p. 12). 
Jung's model of the psyche does indeed seem to support the 
notion of "self-organization" (see chapter three, on chaos 
theory), with its idea of an organizing "center" of 
' :.: . ~ 
consciousness, capable of bringing fragments of experience 
into a developmentally coherent pattern. 
The Individuation Process 
The successful integration of the inner and outer 
realities known as the individuation process constitutes the 
central goal of Jungian analysis, and it is this 
developmental goal that we need to keep in mind when we 
begin to theorize about the relationship of such an expanded 
developmental theory to our thinking about teaching and 
learning. 
The inner guiding factor, or Self, according to Jung, 
was best apprehended through the investigation of one's 
dreams - spontaneous psychic products which establish 
themselves through images and symbols. In his extensive 
investigations into his pa~ients' dreams, Jung noted 
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invariant patterns of symbolic expression, which led him to 
formulate the idea of archetypes, 
basic elemental tendencies.of the human personality 
which produce certain specific kinds of thinking 
patterns common to the entire human species (Singer, 
1973, xxxii-xxxiii). 
He found these collectively experienced patterns 
coincidental with certain well-defined themes and records of 
human mental activity known to us through the various mythic 
traditions. Joseph Campbell, the well known modern 
proponent of the mythic tradition understood the important 
connection between depth psychology and the logic of myth: 
Dream is the personalized myth, myth the depersonalized 
dream, bqth myth and ~ream are symbo~ic in the same 
general way of the dynamic of the psyche (Campbell, 
1973, p. 19). 
In myth, as we know, as well as in dream, the explorer 
encounters perils and obstacles as well as treasures. 
Sibylle Birkhauser-Oeri speaks to the challenges inherent in 
the individuation process: 
(it is) a psychological pattern of development that 
leads one into a confrontation with one's shadow side 
and with evil, and also involves owning up to 
unrealized potential {1988, p. 23). 
This encounter with the "shadow" - aspects of personality 
that have been omitted or suppressed, and which need to be 
assimilated in order to effect the integration of the 
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personality - suggests a kind of complementarity of 
opposites, a common enough theme in numerous mystical 
traditions. The necessity of integrating the shadow sounds 
somewhat arcane, but it can be understood in terms of 
commonly understood psychological principles. Modern, 
bureaucratic society encourages the construction of 
one-dimensional "personas" (the masks we wear to assume 
particular roles in society): the corporate manager who must 
appear all efficiency and productivity, the minister 
expected to consistently reflect goodness and light, the 
mother who exemplifies nurture and self-sacrifice, the 
academic for whom all areas of life are amenable to rational 
analysis. The shadow then, becomes "that part of us which 
we will not allow ourselves to express" (Singer, 1973, p. 
215). The danger of suppressing the shadow (Jung sometimes 
called it the "inferior" part of the personality) is that 
when the unconscious counteraction is suppressed 
it loses-its regulating impulse. It. then begins 
to have an accelerating and intensifying effect on 
the conscious process (Jung, 1969, p. 79) 
The shadow, when denied, finds its own expression, generally 
in the activity of "projections" - "what we cannot admit in 
ourselves we often find in.others" (Singer, 1973, p. 215) -
or in impulsive or inadvertent acts. Jung writes of the 
centrality of coming to terms with this aspect of the 
unconscious: 
The shadow is a moral problem that challenges the 
whole ego-personality, for no one can become 
conscious of the shadow without considerable moral 
effort. To become conscious of it involves 
-
recognizing the dark aspect of the personality as 
present and real. The act is the essential 
condition for self-knowledge, and it therefore, as 
a rule, meets with considerable resistance. 
Indeed, self-knowledge as a psychotherapeutic 
measure. frequently requires .,much= pa;i.nstaking work 
extending over a long period(Singer, 1973, p. 
215). 
Individuation as Spiritual Process 
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Jung understood the ego-personality's coming-to-terms 
with its own background (the shadow) as essentially a 
spiritual act, corresponding with the unio mentalis or 
alchemical union of spirit and soul (Jung, 1963, p.497). 
Further, he suggested that religious doctrines have all 
sprung from s~ch primary spiritua,l exper_ience. This point 
has of course been challenged by some religious historians 
and theologians who prefer to believe in the revelatory 
origins of their particular creeds. Marie Louise von-Franz, 
however, cites a number of examples from various cultures 
in which rituals and religious customs have sprung directly 
from the dreams and· visions of individuals. She 
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demonstrates how these experiences evolve through time, 
until the original unconscious material crystallizes into 
clearly defined and repeatable forms, which can be shared 
with the group, and passed down from generation to 
generation (Jung, 1964, p. 252). Increasingly, of course, 
participants in the rituals have no personal knowledge of 
the original experience, and once meaningful rituals can 
become dry and lifeless forms. This Jungian 
conceptualization of the origin of organized religious forms 
articulates an important difference between religion and 
spirituality, and highlights an inherent tension between 
them: while the spiritual process invites an idiosyncratic 
and unpredictable experience of archetypal energy, religion, 
. .· 
more often than not, codifies and sanctions particular 
archetypes, especially those that serve social needs for 
order, continuity and stability. I would clarify this 
difference by describing spirituality as a dynamic, 
exploratory 'process' and religion as the structured 'form' 
that emerges to contain, and to some extent control the 
process. 
The above distinction is not meant to privilege 
spiritual process and discredit religion. The practice and 
repetition of the original experience, according to Jung, 
need "not necessarily mean lifeless petrification" (1958, p. 
9) - on the contrary, rituals and ~eligious customs may 
continue to provide a vital context for genuine spiritual 
experience for centuries. However, most religious 
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traditions-"resist further creative alterations by the 
unconscious" (Jung, 1964, p. 253) and remain reproductions 
of one person's individuation experience. I would suggest 
that it is this incapacity to sustain a dynamic link between 
their mythic and symbolic constructions and the personal 
psychological-processesof;their·adherents that accounts, at 
least in part, for the diminishing relevance of formal 
religion in many people's lives. 
Despite his skepticism about formal religion, Jung had 
a lifelong interest in the religious impulse, with its 
infinite variety of forms, symbols and motifs, and in the 
modern search for meaning which has accompanied the decline 
of formal religion. He preferred not to think of "God" as 
an entity, but concerned himself with the "God-images" 
constructed in his patient's psyches (a Christian 
theologian once called him a "religious naturalist" 
(Segaller, 1990, p. 23). We: are reminded. here of the 
primacy of the human psyche in the pursuit of religious 
meaning: 
Without a human psyche to receive divine 
inspirations and utter them in words or shape them 
in art, no religious symbol has ever come into the 
reality of our human life (Jung, 1964, p. 253). 
To Jung, the modern discovery of the unconscious, fully 
grasped, excludes the idea of a transcendent and knowable 
spiritual reality outside the mind of the human perceiver 
(Jung, 1964, p. 253), and suggested a Self that is less a 
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transcendent entity than it is what Grumet calls an "I as a 
location of a stream of possibilities" (1988, p. 66). 
The"transcendent function", in Jung's framework, did not 
signify the achievement of·some otherworldly, disembodied 
condition, rather it involved "the transition from one 
psychic condition to another by means of the mutual 
confrontation of opposites" (Jung, 1958, p. 489). It 
encompasses both process and method: 
The production of unconscious compensations is a 
spontaneous process; the conscious realization is 
a method (Jung, 1958, p. 489). 
Indeed, it was Jung's phenomenological methodology and 
his willingness to cope with all forms of psychological 
manifestation in human activity that attracted Macdonald to 
his ideas, ideas which have admittedly undergone much 
' 
revision, especially in the last twenty or so years. Some 
of the most lucid critique has come from feminist scholars 
who have challenged the essentialist underpinnings of the 
principles of the anima and the animus (Spretnak, 1982), and 
who have questioned the supposedly transcendent and 
therefore "anti-body" nature of the archetypes (Goldenburg, 
1989). While I qelebrate the revision of Jung's culturally 
constructed gender biases (and they were many!), I am less 
certain of the critique around the notion of archetypes. I 
am inclined toward Joseph Campbell's understanding of 
archetypes as biologically.grounded: 
The archetypes of the unconscious are 
manifestations of the'organs of the body and their 
powers (1973, p. 51). 
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In "The Spiritual Problems of Modern Man", Jung himself 
seemed to challenge the dualism o.f the mind/body split. We 
must, he says, 
reconcile ourselves to the mysterious truth that 
the spirit is the life of the body seen from 
within, and the body the outward manifestation of 
the life of the spirit - the two being really one. 
I am mindful here of Merleau-Ponty's articulation of the 
"Flesh" - a schema which roots the body as a local "opening" 
and "clearing'' in the multidimensional field of being 
(Levin, 1985, p. 67). This multidimensional "field" of 
being is consistent with the holistic view of the universe 
propounded by Bohm and other physicists. Body, in this 
framework, can be understood as the most dense expression of 
an increasingly subtle, seamless network of relations 
extending in principle to the entire universe. A 
pre-ontological attunement to "Being-as-a-whole", woven into 
embodiment, facilitates the connection with primordial 
archetypal energies. It suggests a movement beyond the 
traditional metaphysical categories in which we have been 
stuck: materialism/spiritµalism,. 
physicalism/transcendentalism, empiricism/idealism, and 
mind/body to name just a few of the more thorny problems in 
philosophy. 
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Synchronicity and Holism 
This reconceptualized psycho/physical model of the 
human subject provides us with a theoretical perspective 
that might explain some of the many anomalies (understood by 
Kuhn [1962, p. 52] to be instances when nature violates 
paradigm-induced expectations) that have arisen in 
psychology, transpersonal psychology, and para-psychology. 
For example, Jung documented numerous instances of 
synchronicity in the experiences of himself and his 
patients. He defines synchronicity as 
the simultaneous occurrence of a certain psychic 
state with one or more external events which 
appear as meaningful parallels to the momentary 
subjective state - and, in cert~in cases, vice 
versa (1955, p. 36). 
"Meaningful parallels" are attributed to chance in a random 
universe characterized by inert particles linked by linear 
chains of cause and effect. On the other hand, in an 
Idealist universe, the coordination bf the psychic and the 
physical are seen as an act of God, or of some principle 
standing outside of empirical nature~ In the holistic model 
of the universe, however, characterized by "interpenetrating 
networks of relationships", meaningful parallels or 
"orderedness" derive from the model itself. Synchronicity, 
says Jung 
is not a philosophical view but an empirical 
concept which postulates an intellectually 
necessary principle. This cannot be called either 
materialism or metaphysics .•• If the latest 
conclusions of science are coming nearer and 
nearer to a unitary idea of being, characterized 
by space and time on the one hand and by causality 
and synchronicity on the other, that has nothing 
to do with materialism.: Rather it seems to show 
that there is some possibility of getting rid of 
the incommensurability between the observed and 
the observer. The result, in that case, would be 
a unity of being which would have to be expressed 
in terms of a new conceptual language. 
(For just such a discussion of new language 
possibilities, I would refer the reader to David Bohm's 
proposal for the "rheomode" (rhea, from the Greek verb 
meaning "to flow"), 
an experiment in the use of language, concerned 
mainly with trying to; find·out whether it is 
possible to create a new structure that is not so 
prone to fragmentation as is the present one 
{1980, p. 31) .) 
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Synchronicity, for Jung, should be added to the scientific 
categories of space, time, and causality to create a more 
inclusive theoretical framework for understanding 
psychophysical parallelism. 
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Shamanism and the New Phy~ics 
Perhaps no other physicist has wandered so far from the 
accepted pathways of science as Fred Wolf, author of 
numerous books on physics (Parallel Universes, Taking the 
Quantum Leap, The Body Quantum). In a recent (1991) book, 
The Eagle's Quest, Wolf explored the relationship of new 
ideas in physics to traditional shamanistic ideas, through 
direct participant-observer research. With his vast 
knowledge of theoretical physics, and a healthy skepticism, 
he stepped foot into the mythic dimensions of the psyche 
with a number,of practicing shamans from a variety of 
cultural traditions. He discovered that the way the shamans 
saw the world was remarkably similar to the way twentieth 
century physicists saw the world: 
Quantum physics, like the shamanic belief, 
indicates that the universe is also made from 
vibrations and that everything in it is connected 
by these vibrations (p. 24 
Shamans, says Wolf, don't just see things interacting in 
cause and effect relationships, but as a spider's web of 
interconnectedness corresponding to the physical theory of 
"non-locality'~ (the idea t:tiat things ~aki~g place here can 
affect things there in an acausal way). How are events 
connected to every other event? Wolf explains that objects 
move as waves in the universe until they are observed. 
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Consciousness, or the act of observation "collapses the wave 
function", making what was implicate explicate. Between the 
causative event and the effect, all possible paths emerge. 
According to the quantum theory (p. 145), some of these 
possibilities 'are remote ahd: require more·· action. 
Unobserved objects occupy multiple paths simultaneously, but 
with observation, one of them emerges (becomes explicate) 
and becomes a "groove" or habit. Habits of mind arise, says 
Wolf, through the creation of least action paths. Paths 
that become habitual become unconscious and we begin to 
behave in self-consistent loops. 
Shamans are able to effect healing, or individuation 
(the bringing to consciousness what has been buried) by 
their ability to enter the mythic realm of probability - by 
choosing non-ordinary reality, they are able to break the 
laws of habitual observation:, free·ing' their clients of 
self-destructive habitual thought patterns. To experience 
this mythic dimension, says Wolf, we must 1) acknowledge its 
reality, and begin to recognize the information that comes 
from it, and 2) learn to shift our focus from the foreground 
(the explicate order) to the background (the implicate 
order). Through self-observation we can learn to extend the 
self beyond the boundaries we set up. 
Wolf speculates that the memory of atoms is contained 
in their energy patterns, and suggests that our unconscious 
minds break down probability waves of energy into energy 
forms called.archetypes. Clearly,· this idea corresponds 
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with Jung's theory that by connecting with archetypal images 
at the very deepest layer of consciousness extends the 
notion of self into the realms of the transpersonal and the 
cosmological. Shamanic physics, says Wolf 
consisted of all the experiences in consciousness 
that result from seeing the universe as a gigantic 
hologram or spider's web .•• by extending one's 
belief system, it was possible to reconnect with 
the whole universe - to become one with everything 
(p. 295}. 
I quote Bohm once again: 
But if we can obtain an intuitive and imaginative 
feeling of the whole world as constituting an 
implicate order that is also enfolded in us, we 
will sense ourselves to be one with the world. We 
will no longer be satisfied merely to manipulate 
it technically to our supposed advantage, but we 
will feel genuine love for it. We will want to 
care for it, as we would for anyone who is close 
to us and therefore enfolded in us as an 
inseparable part (Griffin, 1988, p. 67} 
The story of science has indeed changed. To think that 
physics would have ever stretched to encompass the mythic 
dimensions inhabited by shamans is quite remarkable. But we 
have clearly entered into territory from which there is no 
turning back. As early as 1930, Arthur Lovejoy wrote 
So little seems to be' left.of th~ physical world 
of the older realism that the residuum may hardly 
appear worth salvaging (p. 266). 
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Indeed, as Sir James Jeans so lucidly expressed it, "the 
universe is beginning to look more like a great thought than 
a great machine". The philosophical implications of this 
new science are perhaps best illuminated by physicist Sir 
Arthur Eddington in his statement "something unknown is 
doing we don't know what"! 
Individuation as a Developmental Goal 
When we begin to think of the process of individuation 
as a developmental possibility, we need to keep in mind the 
fact that Jung perceived it to be a mid-life activity. I 
find it, therefore, particularly relevant to the continuing 
education of teachers, and only indirectly pertinent to our 
work with younger students. In my work with both 
pre-service and practicing teachers, many of whom are at a 
mid-point in their lives, I am growing to appreciate the 
profound importance of creating opportunities for the kind 
of growth and exploration intrinsic to the individuation 
process. Jung was clear on what·was of primary importance 
to teaching and learning, and that was the relationship 
between the teacher and the student. Because of the subtle, 
but genuine effects of the unconscious mind of the teacher 
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on the student, he felt that the teacher should be engaged 
in the process of self-discovery and healing: 
no principles, however sound, no clever technique 
or mechanical aids cap rep+~ce t~e i~fluence of a 
- well-developed personality (Fordham, 1966, p. 
112), 
and he suggested that it would be to the real advantage of 
their students if teachers-were to learn more about their 
own inner lives. In accordance with this thinking, I have 
found that opportunities for renewal, rejuvenation, and 
creative expression are at least as vital to the 
professional development of teachers as new methodologies, 
more sophisticated theoretical frameworks, or increasing 
attention to rational, critical analysis (this is not to 
discount the importance of any of the_above, but rather to 
subordinate them to the more inclusive process of 
individuation) . 
I am fortunate to work in an institution with an 
explicit commitment to the education of the whole person, 
which has given me an opportunity to put these ideas into 
practice. I am increasingly convinced that creating a 
secure space in which teachers can explore personally 
meaningful aspects of the individuation process is 
fundamental to the development of teachers with vision, 
purpose and the courage to advocate for the best interests 
of their students. In an integrated curriculum course that 
I teach, a primary requirement is that each teacher immerse 
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herself in the practice of any art form for the entire 
semester, one that they have a passion for, but have not 
given themselves the time to pursue. They keep reflective 
journals about the activities and their responses to the 
work. Over and over, I have observed this process open up 
new psychological horizons and suggest radical shifts in 
their thinking about teaching and learning. Words that 
collectively" emerge from the"group· at'the· end of the 
semester to describe the process inevitably include 
"journey", "discovery", "affirmation", "transformation", 
"opening" and "community". All of the-elements of the 
classic mythic quest are present - venturing forth into 
uncharted territory, overcoming obstacles and perils, 
. ' 
battling the shadow (often composed of self-doubt, 
inadequacies, fears of failure), accepting the shadow as 
part of oneself and transforming it, discovering a great 
treasure and bringing it back to the community (often the 
students they teach). 
One of my graduate stUdents·writes eloquently in his 
journal of the relationship between his own spiritual 
process and his changing ideas about teaching: 
In response to the following quote: "There 
are many ways to allow processes to unfold, but 
perhaps the most essential way is to stay with the 
edge, with the awareness of the group's forbidden 
communication" (Gablik & Dissanayake, 1992): I 
find this true on two levels: First, in my own 
art process I often find myself transported back 
to my years growing up at home; there lie the 
impressions of a world bound up by much forbidden 
communication, of truths neglected, conflicts 
unresolved, growth deferred. Even in my dreams I 
find myself stunted in these years and so if my 
writing is going to purchase my integrity, if it's 
to be a dynamic reflection of me dealing with my 
edge, then I find myself needing to invest in 
creative ways to revisit the scenes of my boyhood 
and try to open up a ?ialog~e with the forces that 
stifleq my·home, school, church, etc. And so, for 
example, with the piece entitled "Holy Water" 
included with this work, I felt very much back in 
the rural church I grew up in, trying to address 
the stagnation of the ritual and of people handing 
over their faith to a·lord and in so doing 
divesting their own responsibility to the depths 
of spiritual growth. To attempt an examination of 
this stagnation was to trespass into a forbidden 
communication ..• so I'm left trying to engage this 
dialogue through my art, trying to break down the 
walls of unconsciousness with a sort of 
craftiness ... in some sense, I'm still the 
pissed-off child who retreated into reticence 
because I didn't have words that had a chance of 
being heard. And now in my lonely cabin in the 
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woods, I'm still trying to come up with the words, 
the images that carry the truth and beauty that 
transcend the petty, belittling conflicts my ego 
is locked into. 
Secondly, within the group dynamic, 
especially the classroom, I'm becoming more and 
more aware of the lines or thresholds or 
limitations that can become imposed on the group 
by its fears, insecurities, cautiousness, or 
simply entropy. In this case, the forbidden 
communication is the unwillingness to take the 
risk of exposing one's experience, of coming out 
of a cynical, detached position, of experimenting 
with one's own sense of breakdown or vulnerability 
- of telling one'~ stbr~. It is~ I:believe, in 
pushing out these lines a little further that 
consciousness is expanded, that the group dynamic 
feels the strength and vitality of someone 
venturing out of their walls - and learning 
becomes a personal an~ a communal experience. 
(Steve Lawless, personal journal) 
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A teacher thus actively engaged in his or her own 
exploratory process is potentially more appreciative of the 
exploratory impulses of their students. To clarify this 
assertion, I'll return to my earlier distinction between 
spirituality-and religion,·and examine teaching and learning 
models germane to each perspective. In most traditional 
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religious models, especially those identified with dominant 
patriarchal forms, the primary epistemological model is that 
of revealed truth. There is a static quality to the 
available knowledge - it exists prior to and outside of 
experience. The representatives of the tradition, be they 
priests or preachers, serve as mediators of religious 
experience, as theystand b~tween God ?i,nd the supplicant: 
A priest is a functionary of a social sort. The 
society worships certain deities in a certain way, 
and the priest becomes ordained as a functionary 
to carry out that ritual (Campbell, 1973, pp. 
99-100) . 
Obedience to the Divine will of a Father-God is a central 
motif in contemporary religions, and "fear, guilt and 
alienation are some of the results" (Spretnak, 1982, p. 
xvi). 
It's difficult not to draw parallels between this 
particular description of formal religion and our relatively 
' ' 
universal approach to schooling. Despite some lip service 
to experience and an occasional nod to the "affective 
domain", education primarily concerns itself with bodies of 
knowledge which exist prior to and largely outside of 
student experience. Teachers, often as not, serve as 
functionaries, carrying out the rituals of an 
overly-bureaucratized society: standardized tests of basic 
skills, lessons in appropriate social behavior, etc. If 
students follow the prescribed behaviors, they may receive 
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rewards (though these may seem as distant as Judgement Day!) 
and if they don't obey the strictures from "on high" they 
might indeed suffer from fear, guilt and alienation. 
A second cluster of experiences, loosely termed 
"integrative" or "holistic'' exemplify a more experiential 
approach to spiritual experience, and more closely 
correspond with the Jungian quest for psychological 
wholeness. Th~se would include, according to Spretnak 
(1982), women's spirituality, goddess spirituality, Wicca, 
Native American spirituality, Taoism, some forms of 
Buddhism, Sufism and. Yoga,'with all of their numerous 
variations. Within these traditions, experience is "the 
stuff of wisdom and growth as an ongoing process" (p. xvi). 
Authority in most of these traditions is most often 
diffused, and spiritual energy is considered "immanent" as 
opposed to, or as-well as, .transcendent. Shamanic practices 
fall within the purview of this latter set of traditions, 
and it is revealing to compare and contrast the 
qualitatively different role of a shaman in the teaching and 
learning situation with that of a priest. Campbell informs 
us that unlike the priest, who serves a deity who was there 
before he came along, 
the shaman's powers are symbolized in his own 
familiar, deities of his own personal experience. 
His authority comes out of a psychological 
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experience, not a social ordination (1973, p. 
100) • 
Like the.Jungian analystwho has accomplished extensive 
work on him or herself, the shaman has traversed the terrain 
of their own unconscious and can therefore serve as "guide" 
to the uninitiated. Every journey into the unknown, 
however, even for the experienced traveler, is a step into 
mystery. It is this very uncertainty, this risk, this 
commitment to an unpredictable and unfolding process that we 
must become comfortable with if we are to approach the 
possibility of "spirituality in education". Jung describes 
the attitude of the ancient alchemist, and it (somewhat 
modified) seems pertinent to the modern teaching and 
learning situation within a spi:d,tual. paradigm: 
• w r • - · -. 
Here is a (student) before me whose nature is 
unknown to me. The nature of the contract to 
which we will commit ourselves is also unknown to 
me. And the goal, the end of the process, is 
equally unknown (1968, p. 393). 
Whether we ascribe to one or the other of the teaching 
and learning models exemplified by the two qualitatively 
different clusters of spiritual experience outlined above, 
what is most important is that we understand that even 
secular educational theories are grounded in often 
unconscious ontological and epistemological assumptions that 
must be made explicit if we are to effect any lasting and 
significant transformation of the educational process. 
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Art, Archetypes·and the Spiritual Process 
In the paper in which Macdonald developed his ideas on 
the transcendental developmental ideology of education, he 
prophesied that the 
human race is beginning to take another major step 
into the unknown source of its imag1nation ... that 
we may be rapidly approaching a new level of 
psychological and cultural growth from which 
dramatically new understandings of human potential 
will emerge (1982, pp. 176-177)~ 
I suspect if he were alive.now, he. would be somewhat 
disappointed in the direction much of the "human potential 
movement" has taken, with some of its more indulgent forms 
of "self-realization" and the commodification of genuine 
spiritual impulses. Macdonald called for a balanced 
approach to spiritual development with the radical 
"centering of. the person in the 'world~'' engaged in the dual 
dialectic between both the individual and the environment 
and the individual and herself. He suggested that if 
psychology was to be useful to educational thinking, it must 
move away from narrow empirical or developmental views, and 
focus upon the ontological.question of human being -
"psychological theory must be grounded in existence and 
utilize the methods of phenomenology if it hopes to cope 
with Being" (1988, p. 181). He was particularly intrigued 
with Jung's methodology, and considered that the "centering" 
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process, which he saw as a psycho-social process, could only 
occur if the doorway to the unconscious mind is "unlocked 
and left ajar ... the process draws its power and energy from 
sources that are not completely explicable" (1988, p. 187). 
Clarissa Estes, whose La Loba character we meant in the 
introduction to this essay, also alludes to the mystery and 
ineffable nature of this source while suggesting some 
fruitful ways of tapping into it: 
this land between the worlds is that inexplicable 
place we_all recognize once.we expe~ience it, but 
its nuances slip away and shape change if one 
tries to pin them down, except when we use poetry, 
music, dance or story (1992, p. 30). 
It is through the various expressive arts that we might 
begin to reconceptualize what is genuinely basic to the 
educational process within a transcendental developmental 
framework for educational theory. These forms of 
expression, now thought by some theorists to embody distinct 
intelligences (Gardner, 1983), open the doorways of 
perception, connect us with archetypal energies, provide 
shared frameworks for the ~nactment ot ar~hetypal motifs, 
and embody shared cultural symbols through which to 
communicate inner experience. This fourfold process - of 
perception, connection, enactment and symbolization deserves 
consideration in an educational theory that holds the 
individuation process (the quest for psychological 
wholeness) as a developmental goal. 
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Contemporary Jungian therapies utilize a variety of 
artistic and imaginative processes to bring the contents of 
the unconscious into explicit form - painting, sculpture, 
sand play, story, active imagination and to a lesser extent, 
movement. The art therapy world owes a great deal to Jung's 
influence. Hans Prinzhorn, in his (1972) study of the art 
work of mental patients suggested that 
creative expression is a spontaneous and 
unconscious effort of the soul to treat itself in 
keeping with a 'uniform metaphysical instinct'" 
(McNiff, 1992, p. 17}. 
Dance therapists understand that repression and emotional 
blocks lodge in the musculature of the human body, and they 
r ... 
work with expressive movement to unblock.rigidified 
energies. 
Jung himself, in his initial investigations into his 
own psychic processes, struggled to express his overpowering 
.dreams and visions through painting, sculpture and word: 
To the extent that I managed to translate the 
emotions into images - that is to say, to find the 
images which were concealed in the emotions - I 
was inwardly calm and reassured. Had I left those 
images hidden in the emotions, I might have been 
torn to pieces by them ... as a result of my 
experiment I learned how helpful' it·can be, from 
the therapeutic point of view, to find the 
particular image which lie behind the emotions 
(1963, p. 177). 
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As a culture we have come to view the arts as a mere 
decoration or the gratification of self-expression. Art 
has, as Dewey long ago suggested, become separated from the 
main currents,of lived experience.· In evolutionary terms, 
however, these are relatively recent developments 
(Dissanayake, 1988), in c0ntrast to the original intents of 
the world's ancient and contemporary primal peoples, who 
prioritize the arts in everyday life as "powerful vehicles 
of personal and collective transformation" (London, 1989, p. 
8). The healing systems of Tibetan harmonic singing, and 
the ritual of Navajo sand painting come to mind as models of 
the creative use of sound, form and color to effect the 
individual as well as the communal healing process. Heide 
Gottner-Abendroth (1982}, in her analysis of an emerging 
modern matriarchal aesthetJc, speaks of the primary 
importance of images and symbols in the transformation of 
psychosocial reality. 
To suggest that we begin to understand the expressive 
arts as "the chance to encounter dimensions of our inner 
being and to discover deep, rewarding patterns of meaning" 
(London, 1989, p. 7), raises the important question of the 
boundaries between education and therapy. I wish I had an 
easy answer to this question. As I work increasingly in 
more "holistic" ways with students, utilizing the expressive 
arts to make contact with deeper layers of personal meaning, 
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I am at once convinced of the educational necessity of doing 
so, and humbled by the additional responsibility. When we 
deal with the archetypes, we "conjure the gods", and 
certainly it must be approached with an attitude of respect 
and reverence. We must, in spite of the difficulties, 
recognize that we live in a broken world, one desperately in 
need of healing, one which has lost touch with its very 
roots of Being - and respond in ways which are commensurate 
with the depth of the crisis. Jung made us aware that it is 
usually a precipitous personal crisis that propels the human 
being into the quest for personal wholeness. Perhaps we 
have reached such a cultural crisis, one wh-ich will demand a 
"collective individuation process" of us. 
La Loba, the Wolf Woman, lives alone in the desert. 
Her sole work is the collecting of bones. She gathers the 
old parched bones together and when the last bone is 
gathered, she sits by the fire and thinks about what song 
she will sing. At last she assembles the bones into an 
entire skeleton, sings over them, and restores the furry, 
pulsing, hungry life to the wolf - "she is known to collect 
t" - • • 
and preserve especially that which is in.danger of being 
lost to the world" (Estes, 1992, p. 27). 
While religion can rightly be challenged for its 
historical oppressions, the recovery of the mystical, 
primordial roots of tradition is potentially emancipatory. 
Philosopher David Levin {1985) reminds us that ancient 
spiritual teaching speaks in the mythic archetypal language 
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of the body's ontological understanding of Being. We must, 
however, remember how to sing over the bones. 
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